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ABSTRACT 
An adversary who makes a frontal attack can be anticipated or repulsed.  
An adversary who attacks from within, however, cannot be so readily countered.  
This study intends to identify defenses against trust betrayers targeting critical 
infrastructure.  Using a Delphi method, the study develops insights of experts 
from more mature arenas of defense against insider threats, such as workplace 
violence and counter-espionage, in order to assist infrastructure stewards with 
defending against the insider threat to critical infrastructure.   
The findings uncover flaws in institutional defenses that adversaries can 
exploit, with infiltrators posing a greater threat than disgruntled insiders.  
Resulting recommendations run counter to accepted wisdom.  These 
recommendations shape the contours of a No Dark Corners approach that 
applies and extends seminal theories of Newman’s Defensible Space and 
Kelling’s Fixing Broken Windows. 
No Dark Corners replaces a laser for a flashlight.  The laser is a narrow 
beam of workplace monitoring only by corporate sentinels, or security specialists.  
The flashlight is a broader beam of employee engagement and monitoring on the 
front lines at the team level.  There are no easy answers.  No Dark Corners 
shows promise in filling the gaps in traditional insider defenses to deliver the 
victory of ownership over surprise. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM, DEFINITIONS, AND CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
An adversary who makes a frontal attack can be anticipated or turned 
back with countervailing force.  An adversary who attacks from within, however, 
cannot be so readily anticipated, nor defeated by force alone.  As a 2008 report 
to the President explained, this is the insider threat problem for critical 
infrastructure: 
Essentially, the threat lies in the potential that a trusted employee 
may betray their obligations and allegiances to their employer and 
conduct sabotage or espionage against them.  Insider betrayals 
cover a broad range of actions, from secretive acts of theft or subtle 
forms of sabotage to more aggressive and overt forms of 
vengeance, sabotage, and even workplace violence.  The threat 
posed by insiders is one most owner-operators neither understand 
nor appreciate. (Noonan & Archuleta, 2008, p.32) 
The overall intent of this study is to deliver countermeasures that critical 
infrastructure defenders can use to prevent terrorist attacks against the United 
States via insider threats and thereby reduce the vulnerability of America’s critical 
infrastructure.   
Throughout this study, insider threat means an individual, and more 
broadly, the danger posed by an individual who possesses legitimate access and 
occupies a position of trust with the infrastructure or institution being targeted.1 
Hostile or malicious insider and trust betrayer also refer to the individual who 
represents an insider threat, although these two terms focus more attention on 
the individual than on the phenomenon.  Infiltrator refers to a subset of hostile 
insider who sees himself or herself as an adversary prior to attaining insider 
status within the targeted infrastructure or institution.  The infiltrator joins a 
targeted employer or group under false pretenses as a means of obtaining 
                                            
1 This definition anticipates and is supported by a research finding described at greater 
length later in the study. 
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sufficient access to facilitate an attack.  Recruited asset, in the context of an 
insider threat, refers to an individual already occupying a position of trust who 
can be induced or manipulated to act against the institution to either carry out an 
infrastructure attack or provide information to support such an attack.  
Institutions refer to public and private sector enterprises, employers, entities, 
and organizations, particularly those that operate critical infrastructure.  
Corporate sentinels refers to the functions and employees in an institution 
whose job it is to perform security functions, including watching over people and 
assets on behalf of the institution.  Finally, No Dark Corners is shorthand for an 
array of defenses centering on a strategy that configures the job to reduce 
chances for a sole individual occupying a sensitive area undetected; another 
trusted employee must be within line of sight or some form of remote surveillance 
or detection must create the possibility that someone may be watching.  
Additionally, No Dark Corners, writ large, broadly refers to the suite of defenses 
that stand in contrast to the conventional wisdom on how to counter the insider 
threat and that form the ultimate recommendations of this thesis.  
Other, more conventional terms apply to the accepted wisdom for 
addressing insider threats:  random audits, background investigations, 
technologically based monitoring, and traditional reliance on a security force 
or other assigned corporate sentinels to exercise the organization’s 
responsibility for insider threat defense.  Random audits may be financial or 
operational checks for unexplained anomalies that could give away a hostile 
insider.  Background investigations, particularly the pre-employment variety, are 
intended to detect the same kind of anomalies in time to bar insider access.  
Technologically based monitoring consists of electronic audit trails, such as 
remote or automated surveillance of operations and the people who carry them 
out, such as access to networks, control systems, and to places or assets 
equipped with surveillance cameras, alarms, or access control devices.  
Corporate sentinels are the institution’s designated watchers.  They include the 
traditional members of a security staff, information technology specialists 
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monitoring electronic mail and other automated systems, and other people and 
functions in an institution who are assigned official roles of oversight.  As the 
research will show, even expert defenders resort to conventional measures such 
as these with the confidence that they can defeat the insider threat.  Yet, on 
further scrutiny, the same experts who champion such countermeasures find that 
they could readily bypass them, if the tables were turned and they themselves 
were tasked with carrying out an insider attack.  Out of this apparent 
contradiction, this study creates a new model under the banner of No Dark 
Corners.  This model accounts for the apparent contradictions and offers a 
different method of dealing with the insider threat. 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The primary research objective is to identify countermeasures that reveal 
trust betrayers and actions that defenders can deploy within existing resources at 
their disposal.  This process involves applying lessons of experts from more 
mature arenas of defense from insider threats, such as workplace violence, line 
management, corporate security, and counter-espionage, in order to assist 
infrastructure stewards with early identification and timely containment of the 
insider threat to critical infrastructure.   
The secondary research objective is to discern possible innovations of 
strategic value.  In other words, if current indicators and countermeasures fall 
short, what should we do differently? 
C. BACKGROUND AND LIMITATIONS 
This study deals with a statistically rare phenomenon, as informed 
observers have found that trust betrayal is statistically infrequent (Shaw & 
Fischer, 2005).  In keeping with the greater, homeland security aim of reducing 
America’s vulnerability to terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure, this study is 
not about thieves, inept employees, embezzlers, or others whose deeds may 
pose an incidental threat.  Nor is it about post-loss event investigations or low-
level policing activities that any institution’s security force carries out in the 
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course of defending the organization’s interests and assets.  Finally, since there 
can be no treason if there is no corresponding betrayal of trust and violation of 
loyalty (Ben-Yehuda, 2001, pp. 307–308), remote hackers and typical cyber 
intruders also fall outside the purview of this study.  Instead, the focus remains 
on countering trust betrayers, or hostile insiders, through real-world, actionable 
strategies. 
If, as the literature suggests, a “miniscule fraction” of the people in a 
position to betray trust actually do so (Eoyang, 1994, p. 80), then quantitative 
methods will not avail in addressing the research objectives of uncovering 
practical countermeasures and strategic innovations.  Under the circumstances, 
an iterative process for collecting and distilling judgments of experts offers more 
promise in such circumstances, hence, the appeal of the Delphi method’s 
advantages (Skulmoski, G. J., Harman, F. T., & Krahn, J., 2007). 
With homeland security being a relatively new field of endeavor (Shaw & 
Fischer, p. iii)2 in the United States and critical infrastructure protection a subset 
that did not emerge as a national priority before 1998,3 there exists no discipline-
specific body of experts on the insider threat to critical infrastructure per se.  
Even those experts assembled to study the cyber aspect of the larger insider 
threat have admitted limitations of the cyber-centric approach in terms of 
instituting effective countermeasures.  For example, two experts have claimed, 
“we need multidisciplinary research teams (not just geeks) investigating what we 
should look for as indicators of possibly malevolent behavior (Brackney & 
Anderson, p. 14). 
Efforts to develop predictive models for detecting and interdicting 
malicious insiders have ranged from a quantitatively based yet unproven formula 
(Puleo, 2006) to broad-based theoretical models designed mainly to predict the 
                                            
2 In their preface, Shaw & Fischer (2005) acknowledge that they have long studied insider 
espionage, but the insider threat, as it relates to international terrorism, “is only now emerging.” 
3 This was the year of the release of Presidential Decision Directive 63, which published the 
findings of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. 
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triggers that lead an assassin or radical group to take violent action (Fein & 
Vossekuil, 1998; Olson, 2005).  The literature contains much analysis on the 
psyches (Kaupla, 2008; Shaw & Fischer, 2005), social climates (Ben-Yehuda, 
2001), and cyber vulnerabilities (Noonan & Archuleta; Kowalski, Cappelli & 
Moore) associated with malicious insiders.  Yet, analysis appears more limited on 
pragmatic lessons and inferential guidance that apply directly to practical 
countermeasures.  However, research on threats from assassins to saboteurs 
suggests that applicable findings may be adaptable from indirectly related works 
and may offer more promise in charting a course to defending against the 
malicious insider who is more dangerous than a computer hacker (Fein & 
Vossekuil; Olson; U.S. Congress OTA, 1990). 
D. APPROACH 
In this context, it stands to reason that defense against the insider threat 
to critical infrastructure would benefit from lessons adapted from more mature 
disciplines, such as counter espionage, prevention of workplace violence, and 
defense against systemic institutional fraud.  Insider threats in these disciplines 
meet the same general definition of insider threats to critical infrastructure, i.e., a 
person or persons with access or knowledge of an organization and the 
motivation or intent to cause harm or adversely affect the organization’s mission.4 
If these other disciplines have the potential to inform the study of insider 
threats to critical infrastructure, it follows that subject matter experts from such 
disciplines, who themselves have long and direct experience in identifying, 
investigating or countering the adverse effects of insider threats, also possess 
insights useful for advancing a deep understanding of the insider threat 
phenomenon.  This study, therefore, adopts the qualitative approach of the 
Delphi method to derive insights and judgments from a diverse group of experts 
                                            
4 This insider threat definition draws on common elements expressed by Noonan & Archuleta 
(p. 5) and Brackney & Anderson (p. 63).  The latter also make a point of defining the malicious 
insider in terms of having access, regardless of whether that access is legitimate.  Thus, in 
Brackney & Anderson’s view, a janitor who has access to a sensitive facility but is not authorized 
to do more than clean it may still be considered an insider. 
 6
who did not interact directly and supplied their evaluative thoughts independently, 
thereby avoiding groupthink or undue influence of dominating personalities.   
Through a series of questions, answers, analysis, and feedback, the 
Delphi panelists supplied insights that at first validated the accepted wisdom on 
insider threat defense, including endorsement of random audits, background 
investigations, and technologically based monitoring.  However, as the Delphi 
inquiries progressed, the same experts ultimately came to identify flaws in these 
defenses that, in turn, laid the foundation for the No Dark Corners strategy that 
this thesis recommends as an alternative to the accepted wisdom. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Delphi respondents were selected based on having previously 
demonstrated “deep smarts” insight “based more on know-how than on facts; it 
comprises a system view, as well as expertise in individual areas (Leonard & 
Swap, 2004).   In addition to at least 20 years of involvement in critical 
infrastructure protection, crisis management, espionage, workplace violence, 
failure analysis, or complex fraud investigations, each Delphi respondent has 
career experience that  included employment in or oversight of employees in the 
private sector.5   
Table 1 presents a general description of the individual expertise of the 
respondents.  Many of the individuals have overlapping areas of expertise, but 
this table focuses on the main skill sets that led to their invitation to form this 
Delphi group.  The reason Table 2 omits some overlapping expertise is that too 
much detail on each expert’s capacity would reveal identities.  Consequently, 
Table 2 represents a fuller picture of the range of talents that this Delphi dozen 
possess, without compromising their confidentiality.   
 
                                            
5 Since 85% of critical infrastructure is considered to be in the hands of the private sector 
(Lewis, 2006), representation of the private sector is important to this study. 
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Table 1.   Individual Expertise of Delphi Group Members 
 
  
Expert 1 Case officer for two different U.S. government agencies.  
Recruited agents in foreign countries.  Investigated fraud in 
private sector. 
 
Expert 2 Chief executive and expert in uncovering collusive networks 
and in managing private sector collaboration with law 
enforcement and prosecuting agencies. 
 
Expert 3 Senior investigator with global due diligence firms.  Investigative 
journalist specializing in complex international fraud cases. 
 
Expert 4 Ombudsman for major police force.  Chief of detectives.  
Former military policeman. 
 
Expert 5 Critical infrastructure security director.  Former undercover 
agent of federal law enforcement agency. 
 
Expert 6 Former case officer recruiting agents for U.S. in third world 
countries. 
 
Expert 7 U.S. counterintelligence officer debriefing traitors. 
Expert 8 Corporate executive and systems integrator for defense 
business formerly involved in development of intelligence 
platforms. 
 
Expert 9 Career investigator, business owner specializing in uncovering 
complex corporate fraud. 
 
Expert 10 Corporate executive, corporate communications specialist and 
crisis management adviser.  
 
Expert 11 Critical infrastructure operations director involved in leading 
agency response to and recovery from major natural disaster. 
 
Expert 12 Clinical psychologist specializing in workplace and domestic 









Interaction with hostile people and organizations 
Critical infrastructure protection, management 




Public or private sector undercover operations 4 
Organizational response to international threats 4 
Response to threats as a police or military professional 4 
Workplace violence case management responsibility 
Crisis communications and response 
4 
3 





Each Delphi round involved transmitting questions by e-mail and 
responding by return e-mail with at least two weeks between rounds.  All 
respondents agreed to participate in the study under standard confidentiality 
protections and with repeated reminders that no classified or proprietary 
information was being solicited for the study.  Of the dozen experts who agreed 
to participate in three rounds of Delphi surveys, 100% saw the process through 
from start to finish.   
1. Delphi Round 1 
The first round of Delphi questions consisted of level-setting questions to 
begin seeking a common definition of the insider threat and its observable 
dimensions.  Round 1 encouraged respondents to review their own experiences 




on what caused trust betrayers to be exposed and what signs pointed the way to 
the exposure.  Appendix A presents the specific questions for Rounds 1, 2, and 
3. 
The objective of leading with the Round 1 questions was to ease into 
thematic content while seeking points of convergence without superimposing 
foreordained conclusions.   
Using this loosely structured combination of easy questions also 
encouraged participation and allowed using a textual analysis tool to seek out 
non-obvious points of convergence, to be discussed further in Chapter II. 
2. Delphi Round 2 
The second round of Delphi questions was more complex and the most 
demanding of the Delphi surveys.  It included feedback from Round 1 and asked 
the experts to comment on the extent to which they agreed with results from the 
earlier round.  Round 2 also presented more narrative questions, before 
concluding with a series of scenario questions presenting two archetypal trust 
betrayers whose descriptions reflected composites of insider threats discussed in 
Round 1.  Related questions asked the respondents to predict which composite 
insider would be more likely to carry out what kind of attack and to match trust 
betrayers relative to a given attack scenario.  The questions from Round 2 
appear in Appendix A, and the feedback that accompanied these questions for 
the benefit of the respondents is in Appendix B. 
By feeding expert input back to the respondents, Delphi Round 2 created 
an opportunity for validation and rejection of ideas captured in Round 1.  It also 
created an opportunity to capture points of expert convergence and divergence 





3. Delphi Round 3 
Finally, the last round played back to the experts their collective responses 
from Round 2.  It then shifted gears.  Delphi Round 3 now took the experts out of 
their customary roles as defenders and cast them as adversaries tasked with 
carrying out an attack against critical infrastructure.  Round 3 asked respondents 
to select a Level 1 critical infrastructure to attack and decide whether to do so by 
recruiting a disgruntled employee already possessing access to the target or, 
instead, rely on infiltrating one’s own agent.  Appendix A, once more, shows the 
questions that formed Delphi Round 3. 
F. SUMMARY 
With the selection of the Delphi methodology, identification of a dozen 
experts to make up the Delphi respondent pool, and formulation of questions to 
explore the insider threat, all that should now remain would be to harvest insights 
and distill them into new, actionable knowledge for the advancement of 
homeland security efforts to defend critical infrastructure.  As the next chapter will 
show, however, the results were varied, and in some cases, even contradictory 





A. DELPHI ROUND 1:  EXPLORING THE PROBLEM 
Round 1 responses diverged widely, as Table 3 shows. Each column 
contains a different expert’s answers to questions across the grey row.  
Highlighted text marks items emphasized or illustrated in case studies that 
respondents offered.  Bold lettering within the highlighted text reflects additional 
emphasis from the experts through either repetition or greater priority within 
respondent comments.  Italics reflect direct quotes experts used for emphasis. 









4-Exposed By 5-Signs Misc. Remarks 
 
1 
An in-place asset.  
Those who leak, 
back stabbers, 
saboteur out to 
destroy, whistle-
blowers, supporters 
of hostile outsiders, 
and professional 
conspirators. 
Worked long hours, 
abused position to 
pay for gambling 
debts.  Road rage 































play a lesser 
role in 
corporate 
cases but is 





Individual, group, or 
organization using a 
position of trust or 
power to advance 
an agenda at the 
expense of the 
larger group.  
Employee having a 
grudge; religious 
(leader)/politician 




Arrogance, as if 
above rules and 
laws.  Displays of 











threats of legal 
action and filing 


































"Beat the system" 
talk, behaviors 
Embezzlement 
and other fraud 






























isolated because of 
elitism or anger and 
aggression 
Elitism – considers 
others inferior.  
Expressed hate 
and anger.  





Willful refusal to 
assist – payback.  
Coercion and 
self-dealing – 





























influence or access 





























don’t act on out 
of  lack of 
knowledge or 






Harm from someone 
"friendly"/Disgruntled 
or infiltrator. 
--- Getting even Usually after 
the fact 
--- Getting even a 
central theme; 
actual damage 
not necessary if 





equities in the 
employer 
organization; 





obligations, wish to 







money, family life, 
outside associates.  
"Beneath me" 
attitude.  Difficulty 
with covert duties 
and lack of 
recognition. 
Caused deaths 
without remorse.  
Few motivated 




















Person(s) in an 
org./Sick fun, spite, 
































position of trust who 
is willing to harm 




or contractors.  
Financial gain most 
common, with relief 
from personal 
financial stress as 









Deterred only by 
strong chance of 
discovery and swift 
punishment.  
Insider is never 
observed as a 
threat, employs 
secrecy, often the 
picture of the 
perfect employee.  
Good audits would 
uncover but are 










entities to submit 
false or inflated 
invoices; 
accepting bribes 
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In Table 3, the first column, E, corresponds to the number assigned each 
expert in Table 1 of the preceding chapter, where the experts were first 
introduced by background and expertise.  The numbered questions 1–5, which 
form the next series of columns, correspond to the main questions of Delphi 
Round 1 (available in their entirety in Appendix A).  A final column captures 
miscellaneous remarks that the experts offered in the course of crafting their 
responses.   
The highlighting, underscoring, and bold type drawing emphasis to words 
in Table 3 represent an attempt to focus on information already suspected of 
being of interest based on attention drawn by respondents, as opposed to 
unguided data mining.  Thus, experts commented more on these items, offered 
cases illustrating these points, or did both.  These areas of emphasis also 
aligned generally with literature on hostile insiders in the fields of workplace 
violence, espionage, and corporate fraud.  As a result, these latter areas of 
emphasis were taken as representative of more indicative or common themes, 
hence, worthy of closer scrutiny—a method some analysts use for avoiding 
analytic overload (Hollywood, Snyder, McKay, & Boon, 2004, pp. xxi and 83).   
Textual analysis using first the overall input and then the highlighted 
material helped uncover common themes in expert observations.  Placing the 





                                            
6 This visual analysis of survey data came via http://www.tagcrowd.com at no cost for 
educational uses, thanks to Daniel Steinbock, a doctoral student at Stanford University.  The 
output itself is called a text cloud, which is also called a tag cloud. 
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Figure 1.   Text Cloud Showing Frequency of Words in Table 3 
 
The words in Figure 1 appear in alphabetical order, but their size and 
relative emphasis tie directly to the frequency of their appearance in the 
unscripted responses.  Thus, y experts used the term “employee” most often in 
their responses, then “insider” with “audits,” “financial,” “hostile,” and 
“organization” next ranking in frequency of appearance.  This first text cloud 
compilation and sorting of overall responses, highlights observations and themes 
common to the insider threat writ large, i.e., the insider as an employee, often 
motivated by financial gain, operating in an organization, and subject to being 
given away by actions, audits, and behaviors. 
To zero in on the more telling remarks of respondents and, in so doing, 
impart greater granularity to the first text cloud, the highlighted material from the 
response compilation (Table 3) next went into another text cloud sorting that 
yielded the results shown in Figure 2.   
 
 
Figure 2.   Text Cloud Showing Frequency of Words in Highlighted Items 
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The text cloud in Figure 2 brought more indicators to the surface.  The 
most telling was unexplained anger, the two most prominent words.  Other 
themes also emerged, such as tendencies of self-aggrandizement and secrecy 
among hostile insiders, which offer possibilities as indicators. A display of 
unexplained anger might, in itself, be insufficient to suggest the presence of a 
hostile insider.  Taken together with other behavior, however, such as secrecy 
and a tendency to self-aggrandizement, some experts found this combination 
more indicative of a potential trust betrayer.  Respondents with backgrounds in 
the worlds of corporate fraud investigations, intelligence, and clinical assessment 
of workplace violence threats independently converged on the notion that the 
malicious whistle-blower is becoming a less pernicious but more common hostile 
insider in the work place.  However, as this employee has an axe to grind or a 
pocket to line, the malicious whistle-blower is unlikely to seek the total 
destruction of a targeted organization, rather than its humiliation or some form of 
compensation.  Meanwhile, money and financial gain, which were prominent in 
Figure 1, were absent from Figure 2.  One respondent indirectly offered the 
reason for this omission by noting that the most destructive damage is rarely 
driven purely by a desire for financial gain.   
The text cloud analyses and two experts’ categorizations of insider threats 
then helped formulate the basis for Delphi Round 2 inquiries. 
Specifically, is there value in broadly categorizing insider threats in terms 
of whether they plan their attacks?  Evidence of planning corresponds to the 
insight of a behaviorist respondent who noted that the saboteur’s objective is 
seeking victory.  By contrast, a dearth of planning that could instead present itself 
as an eruption corresponds to what the same respondent called the rage killer’s 
objective of seeking relief.  Pursuing such a distinction further would offer value 
in contrasting the different types of cases already cited by the respondents.  It 
would also yield a simpler, more intuitive way of drawing distinctions and seeking 
corresponding behavioral signatures that could give away malicious insiders 
before they carry out their attacks.  Thus, this new tentative categorization 
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formed the basis not only for further questions, but for formulation of two different 
kinds of insider threat scenario to structure respondent thinking along common 
denominators without pre-ordaining responses in the next round.  Appendix B 
provides the summary of Delphi Round 1 findings that accompanied the 
questions that went to experts as Delphi Round 2 (viz. the Delphi Round 2 
questions in Appendix A). 
B. DELPHI ROUND 2:  SHARPENING THE FOCUS 
Delphi Round 2 played back the results of Round 1 for to the experts in an 
effort to seek calibration, and also furthered the exploration into indicators 
through a variety of approaches, including a series of scenario-based questions 
to see which of two types of hostile insider would pose a greater threat.  
Respondents received Appendix B to summarize the findings from their initial 
responses.   
1. Overall Results of Round 2 
Some themes invited strong expert convergence: 
 Indicators of unexplained changes in behavior and in resentful or 
disgruntled presentation of the hostile insider. 
 Secondary indicators of the hostile insider exercising overly proprietary 
interest in the job, expressing a perception of unfair treatment, and 
appearing arrogant or elitist. 
 Random audit as a good, if not the best, countermeasure. 
 The planner as the bigger threat to the institution, with some 
distinctions offered in remarks to the effect that a workplace violence 
attack, or rage killing, might constitute a personal tragedy for those 
victimized but was not an existential threat to the institution. 
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Other themes that showed early promise in surfacing useful distinctions 
for further probing failed to win strong or consistent support as indicators in the 
eyes of the Delphi experts. 
 Does the hostile insider have a signature of withholding information?  
Respondents suggested that this might be true enough but was often 
difficult if not impossible to gauge until after the fact, hence of limited 
predictive value. 
 Seeking power, being secretive, and exhibiting decline in performance 
also proved to be nonstarters.  Clarifying comments explained that 
some of these traits were equally visible elsewhere, hence of limited 
value in trying to uncover hostile insiders.  One respondent reasoned 
that ambitious competitors could easily seek power without becoming 
insider threats.  Similarly, another respondent noted that, in his 
experience with traitors, once they had embarked upon a plan for 
stealing secrets to pass to a foreign power, they tended to level off in 
their outward ambitions and general performance.  Evidently, this is to 
avoid inviting scrutiny while, at the same time, concentrate their 
energies on their clandestine endeavors. 
 Efforts at categorization, whether as an insider seeking victory vs. 
relief, or as belonging to one of three classes (embezzler-thief, 
saboteur, or shooter (rage killer/workplace violence perpetrator) also 
failed to comprise a gravitational core to attract expert consensus.  The 
very respondents who first suggested them negated some of these 
tentative categorizations.  Evidently, there is just too much variation in 




2. Depictions of Convergent and Divergent Findings 
Many of the results of Delphi Round 2 lent themselves to capture via 
spreadsheet or chart, hence, these at-a-glance summaries: 
 
Table 4.   Ratings of Insider Threat Observations  
 
Compact Version of 
Question DISAGREE NEUTRAL AGREE 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
A Definition   58% 42% 
B Beat the system 17% 42% 33% 8% 
C Secretive 8% 42% 17% 33% 
D Owns the job 8% 17% 58% 17% 
E Withholds info  33% 33% 33% 
F Arrogant, elitist 8% 25% 25% 42% 
G Unexplained changes  25% 33% 42% 
H Resentful  8% 67% 25% 
I "Perfect" employee 17% 42% 42%  
J Getting even 8% 50% 42%  
K Seeking power 33% 42%  25% 
L Says "unfair"  42% 50% 8% 
M Work declines 25% 42% 33%  
 
In Table 4, areas of strong convergence are highlighted in blue.  Over 
70% expert agreement or strong agreement is evident in responses associated 
with questions A, G, and H.  The agreement is rated strongest for these three 
items because there was also no disagreement registered for any of them.  Also 
highlighted in blue is a fourth item, D.  However, while agreement here also 
exceeded 70%, there was 8% disagreement for the same category.  Items 
highlighted in purple, however, reveal more divergence of expert views. 



















Figure 3.   Areas of Convergence of Insider Threat Observations 
The foregoing areas of convergence are strongest in yielding a shared 
understanding of the definition of an insider threat as an individual possessing 
legitimate access and occupying a position of trust in or with the organization 
targeted.  In amplifying comments, Expert 11 noted that trust betrayers can be at 
all levels, from entry to top management.  Expert 9 observed the need for a 
relationship to the target, which could have an insider being a vendor, as well as 
a director, rather than just a traditional employee.  Finally, Expert 10 pointed out 
that the often-unremarkable member of a janitorial service could manage to gain 
insider access and move about unhindered because the custodial crew is 
virtually invisible in many organizations.  
INDICATOR:  Unexplained changes in personality, mood, or conduct 
were associated with trust betrayers by 75% of the Delphi experts.  Of the 
remaining 25%, all registered as neutral. Expert 5 suggested that such changes 
are not always categorically ostensible.  Expert 7, whose primary focus is 
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espionage, found in his experience that the majority of trust betrayers he 
encountered maintained a nondescript behavior pattern, often to mask hostile 
actions.  Having recruited trust betrayers himself, Expert 1 commented that some 
hostile insiders were bilious by natural disposition, hence offering no additionally 
discernible indication of a threat by an examination of their conduct alone. 
INDICATOR:  Similarly, 92% of the experts agreed that the hostile insider 
may appear resentful, disgruntled, or anti-social.  The remainder, registering 
as neutral, indicated that this is generally true but not necessarily always the 
case. 
INDICATOR:  Finally, while 75% agreed that the hostile insider is likely to 
demonstrate an excessively proprietary interest in the job (i.e., “owns the 
job”), diverging opinions from Expert 5 and Expert 6 noted that such an individual 
may intentionally seek to appear average in order to avoid drawing undue 
attention.  Others, such as Expert 9 noted that the hostile insider involved in a 
demanding scheme would avoid taking vacations in order to constantly cover his 
tracks.    
SUPPLEMENTAL INDICATORS:  The Delphi experts diverged in the 
extent to which they rated these as potential indicators, with an emerging 
consensus that there is enough variation in cases of trust betrayers to make 
none of these dispositive by itself: 
Withholding information.  While 66% saw this behavior as indicative, 
33% rated this as neutral.  Expert 7 observed that it is hard to know what was 
withheld.  Similarly, Expert 1 noted that those who withhold information 
eventually draw attention to themselves, which would be antithetical to a trust 
betrayer’s objectives.  Expert 12, on the other hand, saw this indicator as a 
matter of timing, where early on the hostile insider is very open but may then 
change as a result of not being heard.  Expert 9 best accounted the reason for 
the variation in views on this potential indicator as being anomalous because 
indistinguishable, per se, from behavior of ambitious and competitive co-workers 
seeking advancement.  Also, when used effectively as a tactic, it cannot be 
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readily gauged or identified, therefore, not strong enough to serve as a trapline 
when viewed in isolation.  However, it may be useful as something to look for if 
other indicators are apparent. 
Arrogant, elitist.  Additionally 67% of the experts had observed arrogant 
or elitist behavior on the part of malicious insiders.  Nevertheless, the trait was 
not seen as universal. 
Experts did note that foregoing indicators should be viewed in combination 
with other signals, rather than in isolation, as potential signals of an anomaly 
worth probing further to evaluate its potential to blossom into an insider threat. 
ADDITIONAL AREAS OF CONVERGENCE:  Delphi respondents in this 
round also showed strong convergence in shared observations derived from 
Round 1 that were presented for review and assessment, as Figure 4 shows. 
Figure 4 shows agreement of experts in certain areas with no 
disagreement whatever.  By a two-to-one ratio, Delphi respondents recognized 
unexplained anger as a common indicator for insider threats.  Where experts 
found this indicator subdued, it was concealed until after-the-fact where it 
surfaced in the course of debriefings.  Expert 7, for example, explained that in 
espionage cases unexplained anger tends to be more muted or not displayed in 
order to mask clandestine activities because discovery is the trust betrayer’s 
biggest existential threat.  Expert 2 experienced cases where investigation 
revealed that the insider’s anger was discernible but arguably justifiable, 
particularly if one digs deep enough.  Experts 4 and 12 observed that anger on 
the part of a malicious insider may not be so much unexplained as out of 
proportion to the situation and circumstances, making the insider stand out 
because no one else is exhibiting the same intensity of emotion. 
All experts endorsed the value of random audits not only as a 
countermeasure to catch malefactors but also as a deterrent.  Expert 9 summed 
up the 100% consensus in noting that a rigorous system of audits and reviews 
should discourage all but the most brilliant and determined, but that the proper 
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audit regime might be cost prohibitive.  Similarly, and without exception, all 
experts would find more reason to fear the destructive capacity of the hostile 





Figure 4.   Areas of Convergence from Review of Delphi Round 1 






















Additional areas of 100% convergence were in comparative ratings of 
archetypal hostile insiders personified by two composite characters, a planner 
(“Herman”) and an erupter (“Edna.”). Herman represented a trust betrayer who 
plans an attack and generally exhibits goal-oriented behaviors, while Edna 
represented an individual who erupts and exhibits more reactive behaviors.  In 
the expert judgments of which insider represents more of an institutional threat 
and which is more prone to carry out a complex fraud scheme, 100% of 
responders chose the planner.  In each of these cases, Delphi experts judged it 
more likely that the planner composite character would pose the greater threat to 
the institution and also possess greater wherewithal to plan and carry out a fraud 
scheme that would damage the employer. 
While experts generally rated the erupter as more likely to pose danger to 
people rather than to the institution as a whole, there was some variation and 
debate in ratings, as depicted in Figure 5. 
Explanatory comments accompanying the ratings indicated a general 
agreement underlying the divergence once the rationale for the difference 
surfaced.  The small percentages of experts who rated the planner as potentially 
more dangerous in a workplace violence scenario (8%), or as posing a greater 
threat to people in general (25%), indicated that if the planner were disposed to 
carry out an attack, the experts would expect this attack to be much more lethal 
and potentially devastating than a similar effort by a less methodical, more 
impulsive counterpart.  Thus, in their view, while the erupter would be more 
prone to lose control and strike, this hostile insider’s destructive impact would 
tend to be limited to settling personal scores more than to bringing an institution 
to its knees.  However, if the planner were intent on carrying out an attack, his 







Figure 5.   Variation in Expert Ratings of Planner vs. Erupter Insider Types 
Interestingly, the same breakdown for People Threat in Figure 5 appeared 
in judgments on likelihood of this personality getting involved with an activist 
group with hostile intentions for the organization, shown in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Planner Less Likely to Join Activists 
Amplifying remarks indicated that the erupter would be more likely to seek 
dissident connections by virtue of feeling more removed from society (Expert 4).  
The planner, on the other hand, would be reluctant to associate with outside 
groups because he is not a joiner (Expert 1) and does not trust others readily 
(Expert 4).  The erupter would be easier to co-opt or otherwise manipulate 
(Expert 5).  Another respondent, Expert 12, judged the erupter more vulnerable 
even to being used unwittingly, whereas the planner could be more susceptible 
to manipulation if an activist group were to play to his ego and magnify his 
perceived importance to their cause. 












Finally, the greatest divergence concerned which type would be more 
likely to compromise insider information that could serve in an adversary’s 
targeting of an institution or infrastructure.  Respondents judged the erupter more 
likely to compromise such information by a 2:1 margin, as Figure 7 shows.  The 
divergence of views traced to expert opinions that the planner, might be 
somewhat likely to compromise information while still minimizing personal 
exposure to discovery, while the other, more volatile personality, would be 
generally more likely to compromise information with less forethought and with 
less regard for consequences once committed to a course of action.   
 
 
Figure 7.   Compromise of Information More Likely by Volatile Insider 
C. DELPHI ROUND 3:  THINKING LIKE A PREDATOR 
Delphi Round 3 played back the results of Round 2 to the experts in an 
effort to solicit validation while also preparing them to shift gears.  Now, the 
experts had to set aside their traditional roles in infrastructure and institutional 
defense in order to think like an adversary and consider how they would use an 
insider to carry out a terrorist attack against a Level 1 infrastructure:  water, 
power, or telecommunications.7  Accordingly, respondents received Appendix C 
to summarize the findings of the preceding round, along with the questions in 
                                            
7 Recall from the questions for Delphi Round 3, Level 1 critical infrastructures, such as water, 
power, and telecommunications/information technology are rated as primary because of their 
capacity for influencing cascading failures among the rest of the critical infrastructures (Lewis, 
2006, pp. 56–57). 






Figure 3.  Respondents also received a separate attachment, which supplied the 
charts and diagrams from Delphi Round 2, Section B above, for respondents 
interested in greater detail.  Since this material is discussed at greater length in 
the previous chapter, it is not repeated in an appendix. 
1. Overall Results of Round 3 
Some themes invited strong expert convergence: 
 Predominant selection of power as the best infrastructure to target, 
for reasons of accessibility and impact. 
 Majority, two-to-one preference of experts for an insider attack 
relying on using an infiltrator rather than on recruiting a disaffected 
insider who is already in place. 
 Identification of technological monitoring and No Dark Corners 
(explained below) work design as the more likely barriers to a 
successful attack, particularly when used in tandem, than such 
measures as random audits and background investigations, despite 
higher ratings for such measures during earlier Delphi surveys.  
 Assessment of strong deterrent value for sting or dangle 
operations, which involve flushing out hostile insiders by pretext 
and could include luring a hostile insider to join what purports to be 
a terrorist organization that does not really exist or having a trusted 
insider exhibit behaviors that give the appearance of being an 
excellent recruitment target to cultivate. 
 
Other themes that showed early promise from the same experts regarding 
the insider threat as defenders failed to win strong or consistent support  in the 
eyes of the Delphi experts approaching an infrastructure target as 
attackers. (These apparent contradictions warrant analysis and are discussed at 
greater length below and in the next chapter.)  Some of these:   
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 Brother’s Keeper option, a shorthand for security awareness programs 
and encouragement of co-workers to identify and act on suspicions of 
hostile or inexplicable insider activities. 
 Random audits, which could be operational process audits, financial 
audits, or any combination that could potentially uncover evidence of 
hostile activity. 
 Background investigations or updates, which involve screening of new 
hires and possible periodic update investigations of existing employees 
2. Depictions of Findings 
As for the preceding round, the results of Delphi Round 3 lent themselves 
to capture via spreadsheet or chart, hence, these at-a-glance summaries: 
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Table 5.   Countermeasure Ratings by Experts as Attackers 
 
 1-No 2-Easily  3-Surmountable 4-Signif but  5-Potentially 
 obstacle overcome problem surmountable insurmountable
      
A. Brother's  0 42% 50% 8% 0 
Keeper         
B. No Dark  0 25% 25% 42% 8% 
Corners        
C. Random  8% 42% 25% 25% 0 
Audits         
D. Tech 8% 0 50% 17% 25% 
Monitoring        
E. Backgnd Invs 8% 42% 42% 8% 0 
or Updates         
F. Sting or 0 50% 8% 25% 17% 
Dangle Ops        
      
  Over 40% rate as significant at some level, some potentially insurmountable 
  At least 75% rate as minor obstacle, handled with average resources 
 
In Table 5, the three countermeasures that rated as significant enough to 
be potentially insurmountable are highlighted in yellow.  Over 40% of experts saw 
these countermeasures, or countermeasures, representing an obstacle to attack 
at some level of significance sufficient to require considerable effort and 
resources, if not insurmountable, which represent the combined ratings of 
columns 4 and 5.   
TECHNOLOGY-BASED MONITORING.  This measure received the 
highest of the potentially insurmountable ratings, 25%.  Yet, it also received an 
8% rating of no obstacle at all.  Amplifying comment from Expert 4 explained this 
wide range of ratings by pointing out that this kind of monitoring is not widely 
available or deployed across the targeted infrastructures, and in any case, is 
unreliably tracked and interpreted in time for targets to make effective use of it in 
preventing many attacks. 
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STINGS.  Similarly, sting or dangle operations, which rated the same 
combined score of 43% in the last two columns, albeit in inverse proportions, 
also had high ratings (58%) suggesting such measures could be overcome 
without undue strain.  Expert remarks shedding light on reasons for this variation 
included Expert 2’s observation that a sting operation would be the greatest 
deterrent to recruiting an apparently disgruntled insider.  However, if the trust 
betrayer were an infiltrator sufficiently trained in operational security, he or she 
would be inoculated and less susceptible to compromise than a recruit under less 
stringent ideological or operational control.  Expert 5 noted that few critical 
infrastructure stewards have the stomach to support sting operations, as the 
negative reaction of the work force could easily result in untenable situations with 
the labor unions representing the bulk of the institutions employees.  None of the 
experts dismissed this option as posing no obstacle whatsoever. 
NO DARK CORNERS.  Finally, this option, at 50%, represented the 
highest-scoring countermeasure in the combined columns 4 and 5.  Experts were 
presented with this term as a shorthand for an array of defenses centering on a 
strategy that configures the job to reduce chances for a sole individual occupying 
a sensitive area undetected; another trusted employee must be within line of 
sight or some form of remote surveillance or detection must create the possibility 
that someone may be watching.  Some of the experts had experienced this 
approach in the defense or nuclear security industry in the form of two-person 
integrity rules or no-alone zones, respectively.  Here experts also diverged, with 
50% rating this option just as easily yielding to average resources or easily 
overcome (combining columns 2 and 3).  However, none of these experts 
dismissed this option as posing no obstacle.  Expert 5 noted that this approach, 
in combination with technology-based monitoring, would be even more 
insurmountable, while Expert 7 saw this option as more effective than most 
human mechanisms.  Expert 1 attested to the effectiveness of No Dark Corners, 
where feasible, but found that the nature of the kinds of target he would attack 
was such that minimal staffing with skeleton crews made the approach 
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impractical, unless supplemented with surveillance cameras or other technology 
that would permit real-time audit trails serving as a virtual co-pilot keeping the 
potential trust betrayer in check.   
RANDOM AUDITS.  Why would a measure universally heralded as an 
effective counter to insider attack in Delphi Round 2 emerge in this round as a 
minor obstacle in the eyes of 75% of the experts simulating an adversary?  The 
numbers do not tell the story.  The narrative remarks offer a deeper 
understanding of the apparently discrepant findings.  Expert 2, as one who has 
performed operational audits to uncover foul play in a number of Fortune 100 
corporations, noted that random audits are seldom truly random.  Instead, an 
astute observer sees them coming.  Moreover, audits performed by external 
accounting agencies tend to be relatively benign and even susceptible to 
organizational pressures that make a satisfactory audit the default.  Even when 
an audit probes to the point of uncovering questionable activities, it is generally 
easy to bluff one’s way through it.  Experts who themselves regularly conduct 
audits to uncover fraud noted that, as much as they endorse random audits, their 
value is highly variable and the audits are seldom a threat of actual exposure, 
given sufficient preparation and maneuvering skill on the part of the person 
audited. 
BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS.  Several experts at one time made 
their living performing or managing background investigations for national 
defense security clearances or as part of corporate due diligence in the context 
of mergers or other business activities requiring verification of individual 
trustworthiness.  Citing a current, professional reference manual, one of these 
experts noted that the pre-employment screening industry is relatively new, that 
concerns for privacy and data protection sharply limit the reach and scope of the 
average background investigation, and that the requirements of the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act generally mandate that employers disclose negative findings to 
applicants and allow them to correct false or misreported information (Protection 
of Assets Manual, 2006, pp. 1–IV–1 to 1–IV–18). For these reasons, the experts 
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schooled in this area rated these investigations as low hurdles and commented 
that the uninitiated tend to expect more revealing and deterrent value from 
background investigations than these will actually yield for targeted 
infrastructures and institutions.  Expert 9 enlarged on this theme as follows: 
 The vetting process may be nonexistent, particularly for vendors.  Yet 
the infrastructure site where the vendors arrive will often grant access 
on the assurances of the vendor firm that it has performed standard 
background investigations. 
 When present, the vetting process may nevertheless be delayed in its 
execution and completion.  In other words, even when vendors are 
operating under the assumption that their background investigation 
program is functioning properly, the reality is likely to be that only 
cursory attention has been paid to the process, with omissions in 
employment history left unexamined. 
 The typical background investigation has multiple blind spots to 
disappear into.  Time and budget constraints often compel the best 
investigator to cut corners or accept information by telephone that 
might raise suspicions if obtained in a field visit.  Thus, accommodation 
addresses and false front “former employers” may be accepted as 
references over the telephone, when a field visit would reveal the 
“business” is a residential mail drop.  Moreover, even the best 
investigative reports tend to require some arcane knowledge for proper 
interpretation.  The clerk charged with processing this report, however, 
is unlikely to notice that the investigation did not cover a county of 
residence that  was different from a county of employment claimed by 
an applicant—possibly because the same clerk neglected to order an 
investigation for the additional county, in an effort to spare time and 




applicant has been serially rejected by other employers, since privacy 
concerns may well shield what would qualify as suspicious activity 
worthy of further scrutiny.   
Similarly, Expert 11 pointed out that many critical infrastructure 
organizations do not perform thorough background investigations on employees 
or contractors, particularly if they are small or resource-constrained.  Contrary to 
traditional reliance on the “exceptionally thorough vet” championed by 
counterintelligence experts (Wright, 1987, p. 301), the expert affirmed that this 
level of investigation is simply not an option for most infrastructure workers.  
Expert 4 actually selected a rural critical infrastructure target, examined its 
structure and operations, and determined that its management did not perform 
background investigations at all.  Expert 7, from a national security perspective, 
noted that a well-developed false front and attention to maintaining a simple 
cover story without drawing attention are all it takes for a trust betrayer to 
sidestep the background investigation or periodic update.  As a historical 
example, he cited the case of the surgeon general to George Washington, Dr. 
Benjamin Church.  Church had unexplained, sudden wealth that permitted him to 
afford to keep a mistress.  While Washington had excellent intelligence networks, 
he lacked a counterintelligence officer whose business would have been to 
question whether the sudden wealth-signaled agent payments from British 
masters or some other indiscretion might disqualify Dr. Church from a position of 
trust. 
Experts generally noted that background investigations do deter convicted 
criminals and blatant malefactors.  However, they also questioned their value as 
a countermeasure because the foregoing variation and inconsistency in 
background investigations neither assures nor reliably results in the desired 
benefit. Since the Fair Credit Reporting Act requires considerable disclosure to 
individuals investigated, two experts noted, a committed infiltrator can easily 
discern the gaps in pre-employment screening by reading such laws and 
performing online research.  Experts also indicated that an intelligent adversary 
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could easily send the same applicant to multiple infrastructure employers in a 
given area until hired.  Expert 5, for example, pointed out that aging work forces 
and relative lackluster appeal of critical infrastructure are such that basic skills 
are in high demand.  Thus, anyone showing technical aptitude and an interest in 
accepting entry-level wages could easily find the candidate employer receptive to 
cutting corners to fill vacancies.  Experts 4 and 11 thought that small utilities in 
particular were subject to relying on visceral judgments in hiring decisions.  Such 
environments give more weight to an introduction from someone in hiring 
manager’s community or service club than to an elaborate cover story calculated 
to deflect the routine probe of a consumer-reporting agency calling to verify 






















Figure 8.   Expert Rating of Countermeasures Against Infrastructure Attack 
Finally, Figure 9 shows strong expert convergence on both target 




Figure 9.   Target Selection and Choice of Insider for Infrastructure Attack 
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Experts who chose power as their target of preference, 58%, noted that, 
unlike water, electricity does not have reservoirs of additional supply to offset 
catastrophic outages and that the impact of power disruptions is more immediate 
and visible than similar disruptions of other infrastructures.  Moreover, the 
opportunity for cascading failures is considerable, as telecommunications, water 
treatment and distribution need power to operate.  Additionally, as Expert 5 
pointed out, the electrical industry is in desperate need of skilled workers, and 
qualified individuals with skills that are in demand would likely find little difficulty 
in gaining employment and sufficient access to be able to discern major system 
vulnerabilities in fairly short order.   
Similarly, water systems operated by small municipalities or remote 
jurisdictions would be relatively easy to penetrate and could have many of the 
details of their system readily available in the public domain, per Expert 11, who 
spent a career in this infrastructure, as well as by Expert 4, who examined one 
such target and found it easy to attack.  Thus, 34% of the experts chose water as 
a viable infrastructure target 
Finally, although few (8%) chose telecommunications as a target, Expert 9 
approached the attack scenario by allowing access to guide target selection.  He 
then found that telecommunications companies rely heavily on vendors, which he 
judged an Achilles heel and a pathway for infiltrating an agent with little risk of 
detection in time to prevent an attack.  Specifically, Expert 9 judged private 
telecommunications utilities the most susceptible to vendor infiltration, especially 
as fiber optics facilities lease out segments of their premises to a variety of fly-by-
night providers at Internet hotels.  Here, each provider typically relies on unvetted 
legions of technical contractors of a near-infinite variety of national origins who 
appear at all hours of the night demanding immediate access to the facility in 
barely intelligible English in order to work on their client’s latest communications 
crisis.  While the majority of these individuals are no doubt technicians who are 
what they claim to be, a malicious new hire could enter their ranks and gain 
instantaneous freedom of maneuver without drawing attention. 
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INFILTRATING VS. RECRUITING.  As Figure 9 shows, experts judged it 
preferable by a 2:1 ratio to infiltrate an agent rather than recruit one already in 
place.  Experts gave the rationale for this selection as generally hinging on one 
or more of these factors: 
Time.  Given the scenario in the Delphi Round 3, questions that cited Al 
Qaeda-style tactics and a willingness to spend months to years before executing 
an attack, there was time enough to train an operative and have him or her apply 
to enough potential targets until hired.  Then there was time to obtain system 
vulnerability information and exploit it before being discovered or interdicted.  
Because of privacy concerns, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and lack of any 
mechanism within the target to track or notice an infiltrator’s activities outside of 
the scope of employment, background investigations would offer little value in 
detecting anomalies.  Thus, once hired, an infiltrator could make annual trips to 
overseas terrorist training camps, safe in the knowledge that his employer and 
target was prohibited from prying into his personal affairs without incurring 
exposure to union grievances and charges of invasion of privacy. 
Trustworthiness.  An infiltrator would be selected for ideological 
compatibility and skills suited to the attack contemplated.  This individual could 
be expected to be highly receptive to orders.  A disgruntled insider with 
grievances against the target, however, would likely be much more difficult to 
control.  Lacking the same training, discipline, or motivation, recruited assets 
would also be more likely to compromise the attack by giving themselves away or 
revealing identities of co-conspirators or details of the operation. 
Level of Access.  Unlike access to classified intelligence information, 
critical infrastructure details are generally masked more by virtue of being 
esoteric than safeguarded.  Thus, the essential information needed for targeting 
an infrastructure component is equally accessible to an insider who is a relative 
newcomer with junior-level access as to a long-term employee who possesses 
more arcane knowledge.  The latter may have an axe to grind and a level of 
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emotional instability that more than offset the limited-targeting information 
available to an infiltrator who can be trusted not to compromise the attack.   
D. ADDITIONAL EXPERT INSIGHTS AND NARRATIVES 
Delphi respondents appended numerous comments with their input.  
Some contradicted their earlier views.  For example, among the strongest initial 
proponents for random audits as an effective countermeasure, Experts 2, 3, and 
6 later rated this measure as a marginal hurdle, if they themselves were planning 
an infrastructure attack.  The reasoning behind this apparent discrepancy, 
however, became clear on reviewing their comments on conditions under which 
audits could be counterproductive.  A sampling of indicative remarks such as 
these appears in Appendix D as an aid to the analysis that follows in Chapter V.  
In the interest of restricting the sheer volume of these remarks to manageable 
lengths while also maintaining respondent confidentiality, Appendix C omits 
reference to earthy comments and case descriptions that would likely point to the 
identities of some experts. 
E. SUMMARY 
Delphi Round 1 launched the exploration into the insider threat by 
canvassing the views of experts from different fields and experiences.  Delphi 
Round 2 sharpened the focus on hostile insiders by drawing distinctions and 
facilitating expert convergence on indicators to monitor unexplained changes, 
anti-social behavior, and excessively proprietary interest in the job.  Round 2 also 
validated expert confidence in random audits as a means of defeating trust 
betrayers.  Round 3, however, eroded this confidence in random audits once 
respondents shifted gears to think like adversaries instead of defenders.  They 
rated a number of countermeasures in terms of how much of a hurdle these 
countermeasures would pose in carrying out a successful attack against critical 
infrastructure.  Experts now reconsidered random audits, previously judged as 
strong measures, but now diagnosed as flawed.  Instead, redesign of work in a 
No Dark Corners approach emerged as a strong countermeasure, particularly if 
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used in combination with technology-based monitoring.  Background 
investigations and periodic updates offered disappointing value as 
countermeasures in the eyes of the respondents who, again, noted flaws that 
greatly reduced their usefulness in preventing attacks or uncovering trust 
betrayers.  Finally, Round 3 highlighted the power sector as a preferred critical 
infrastructure target and the infiltrator as the insider threat that experts preferred 
to recruiting an agent already holding access sufficient to carry out or support an 
insider attack. 
Next, Chapter III will examine the Delphi results by establishing how the 
findings relate to emerging trends in an overall structure and how they inform 
judgments on strategies that critical infrastructure defenders can use to prevent 
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III. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
As the preceding chapter revealed, Delphi experts began with 
observations in general alignment with a model of the insider threat consistent 
with the existing literature.  The hostile insider seemed likely to emerge as a 
disgruntled employee with the capacity to plan a devastating attack and the 
arcane knowledge to make the most of it.  Indicators of this trust betrayer 
included unexplained anger and other suspicious behaviors, like undue secrecy 
and self-aggrandizement, potentially serving as red flags.  Finally, 
countermeasures such as random audits, monitoring of employees, and 
investigations appeared likely to offer value as ways to thwart this kind of insider.  
By the end of the Delphi process, however, the same experts arrived at different 
conclusions.  Their judgments flew in the face of this accepted wisdom. 
Taken in isolation, the individual Delphi inquiries would have presented 
only a fragmented view instead of the more intricate mosaic that represents the 
insider threat to critical infrastructure.  By itself, Delphi Round 1 might have 
stopped at a common definition of the insider threat and the realization that 
discovery was often retrospective, with indicators such as unexplained anger 
susceptible to being masked until after an attack occurred.  Similarly, Delphi 
Round 2 might have stopped at distinguishing the main threat as a schemer who 
plans rather than a volatile career employee who erupts.  Finally, without the 
context of preceding rounds, Round 3 would have probably missed concluding 
that the infiltrator makes the more plausible insider threat.  Nor would Round 3 
alone have prepared Delphi experts to delve beneath the surface to discern 
exploitable weaknesses of defenses such as background investigations and 
random audits.   
Without going through the entire Delphi process, where every level of 
understanding was iterative, the experts would have focused too intently on the 
trees of countermeasures to see the larger forest of workplace realities.  Thus, 
there would have been little opportunity to identify a systemic vulnerability in the 
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way targeted institutional employers limit security roles to corporate sentinels to 
the point of creating or ignoring dark corners where an insider threat can strike.  
Absent the entire series of Delphi explorations, it would not have become 
apparent that layering security measure atop security measure ultimately 
undermines trust and supplies the hostile insider more maneuvering room.  
Instead, the Delphi research demonstrated that a counterintuitive approach of 
distributing responsibility for defense among work team members and configuring 
work to maximize visibility to the team could provide the No Dark Corners 
approach discussed below. 
A. WHY INFILTRATOR VS. DISGRUNTLED INSIDER? 
First, research results suggested that the terrorist attacker targeting critical 
infrastructure would more likely use an infiltrator than a disgruntled insider 
already in place.  A career employee with long-term access and in-depth 
knowledge of the inner workings of any institution or critical infrastructure will 
necessarily know more about how to dismantle the organization or its critical 
assets than an infiltrator new to the entity.  The same careerist, given the time 
and inclination to plan, is in the best position to develop and carry out a 
devastating attack that circumvents defenses.  However, the disgruntled insider 
is potentially unstable and difficult to control.  According to the Delphi experts, 
this type is not a joiner and is likely to be too egocentric to accept direction well.  
Volatility makes this person an operational risk who may compromise details of 
an attack out of disagreement with the particulars or out of spite at not having 
been consulted for every move.   
Additionally, in the age of the Internet and with critical infrastructure 
targets that have traditionally operated openly without the security precautions of 
the national security sector, utilities and their employees remain highly 
accessible.  Their critical assets are immobile.  Thus, they cannot move a system 
whose location or specifics have been compromised.  In this context, the  
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targeting information necessary for mounting an infrastructure attack need not be 
so esoteric as to be available exclusively to a career insider with very detailed 
knowledge.   
Instead, as the Delphi experts reasoned, an infiltrator who gets through 
the door, even at a relatively low level for a limited time, should be able to 
accumulate enough details to enable an attack without having to spend years 
masquerading as an innocuous employee.  We also need to remember that 
Level 1 critical infrastructures are desperate for talent and have aging work 
forces with few systemic arrangements for recruiting, training, and deploying 
successors.  Thus, as Expert 5 noted, infrastructure employers are prone to 
welcome any skilled workers without criminal convictions who show an interest in 
accepting entry-level positions. The same employers make frequent use of 
contractors who soon gain unfettered access to their systems.  This situation 
gives an infiltrator two paths of entry:  as a direct employee or as a contractor.  
Infiltrators may even try the two approaches concurrently without fear of one 
rejection influencing the possibility of another.  In this milieu, if the remaining 
defenses (described below) are also flawed, the chances for a successful attack 
begin to tilt more in favor of an infiltrator than a disgruntled insider.  The infiltrator 
may not have quite so much access, but he can definitely be better controlled, 
focused, and more disciplined about concealing telltale indicators of an 
impending attack to avoid compromising the attack. 
B. TRADITIONAL DEFENSES FACING INFILTRATOR THREAT 
Given the foregoing circumstances, the weaknesses of traditional 
defenses against this insider threat appear more evident if depicted in the context 







Figure 10.   Traditional Situation:  Infiltrator Meets Infrastructure 
Figure 10 depicts the situation in which infiltrator and infrastructure find 
themselves when these countermeasures and their limitations impinge upon 
each other in the traditional scheme of penetration and defense.  In this 
conceptualization, the adversary’s job is to select a target, prepare an infiltrator, 
and gain entry into the target to the point of being able to probe and maneuver 
with unimpeded access.  It falls to the infiltrator to pass the background check 
and then enter and pass a probationary period during which, or at least after 
which, the infiltrator anticipates having sufficient freedom of maneuver to gather 
information unimpeded by any close scrutiny or interference.  The infiltrator 




insufficient oversight and management by exception (BusinessDictionary.com, 
2009), as long as his behavior and work performance do not deviate so much 
from the norm as to invite attention.   
1. Infiltrator Step 1:  Get through Screening  
The standard screening, or pre-employment, background investigation 
presents a low hurdle to the prepared.  As long as the infiltrator does not have a 
record of criminal convictions or obvious disqualifications, like inability to lift 25 
pounds in a job whose essential functions require some manual labor, he or she 
has little to fear from the third party consumer-reporting agency performing the 
background check.    
The more invasive background and update investigations permitted for 
national security employment are not available for the public and private sector 
employers who operate the nation’s critical infrastructure.  Nor is it feasible to 
demand the same level of scrutiny for a maintenance mechanic as for an 
intelligence analyst.  Besides, the telltale component of such investigations, the 
probe for financial irresponsibility, is only useful in cases where trust betrayal is 
primarily driven by money, exemplified in the so-called “marketplace espionage” 
most frequently observed in counterintelligence cases of the 1980s (Allen & 
Polmar, pp. 3 and 47).  However, as Herbig (2008, p. v) discovered in her study 
of trust betrayal in such cases over time, the trend in the last ten years has 
changed:  the most common driver for today’s traitors is divided loyalties, i.e., 
ideological rather than monetary motivation.  Consequently, yesterday’s focus on 
finances as an indicator of possible trust betrayal offers limited value in detecting 
today’s traitors who will be living well within their means.  They will also be 
showing no signs of the kind of debt indicative of financial hardship that would 
make them targets for bribery or ostensible candidates for selling out their 
employers to relieve financial distress Similarly, an infiltrator sent into an 
infrastructure employer to attack it will be unlikely to draw attention by amassing 
bad debts that set off financial responsibility alarms, assuming a credit report is 
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even requested as part of the background investigation.  Nor will this individual 
invite negative scrutiny through drunk driving or criminal convictions that the 
average background investigation detects through a standard check of superior 
court records in counties of residence and of employment.8 Insulating the 
infiltrator even more from what such background investigations uncover is that 
the infiltrator is already under the control and sponsorship of a primary, albeit 
undisclosed, employer:  the attacker.  Thus, the infiltrator is seeking infrastructure 
employment not so much for monetary or professional rewards as for access to 
an assigned target.  Meanwhile, the attacker coaches the infiltrator to avoid 
actions that would raise eyebrows.  Moreover, the larger and more sophisticated 
the attacker’s organization, the more candidates available to choose from in 
qualifying an infiltrator, and the more likely that the ultimate selectee will arrive on 
the job with an unblemished record. 
To complicate matters more for defenders, the legal constraints affecting 
employers in America severely limit a critical infrastructure steward’s ability to 
expand the scope of a background investigation or to use its product in any way 
that is not demonstrably related to a given job vacancy (Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, 2009, pp. 1–6).  The same applies to any program for 
performing update investigations on existing employees.  As one industry 
guideline cautions, “The consideration of extraneous information that is not a 
valid predictor of job performance can create a source of liability” (Pre-
employment Background Screening Guideline, 2006, p. 24).  In the context of 
employment laws prohibiting job discrimination yet defending privacy, it is the 
rare hiring manager who dares flaunt such guidance by rejecting any otherwise 
qualified applicant, even if subtle or stated antipathies against the United States 
surface during the hiring process.  Fidelity to America is seldom called out as a 
hiring criterion for work at a utility that operates critical infrastructure.  In the 
                                            
8 In the United States, employment-related investigations can only legitimately use conviction 
records, not arrest records.  Only law enforcement has access to the latter and is prohibited from 
sharing them with employers so that the latter do not unfairly affect an applicant’s livelihood by 
making adverse hiring decisions before the legal system has decided actual guilt (Pre-
employment Background Screening Guideline, pp. 20–24).   
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broader context of employment law, anti-discrimination protections, and 
limitations on the extent to which employers may practically scrutinize applicants 
for work at critical infrastructure sites, background investigations are unlikely to 
unmask any but the most unsophisticated of infiltrators.   
Update investigations, if performed at all, typically come after seven years 
because this is the standard limit that many states and the Federal Credit 
Reporting Act recognize as the maximum period for making criminal history 
available for retrieval for employment purposes (Pre-employment Background 
Screening Guideline, pp. 20, 22).  Like pre-employment investigations, updates 
performed through a credit bureau or other agency falling under the rules of this 
Act must also be fully disclosed to the subject of the investigation.  An infiltrator 
requiring more than seven years to gather insider information to support an 
infrastructure attack would have aged enough to cast doubt on his or her 
motivational zeal and to be suspected of beginning to identify too closely with the 
target. 
2. Infiltrator Step 2:  Gather Information 
As Figure 10 shows, once safely through the door, the infiltrator now 
interacts primarily with fellow employees and a boss, who supplies the 
institution’s direct oversight during the probationary period.  Corporate sentinels, 
whether security staff, auditors, information systems guardians of the computer 
network, human resources recruiters, attorneys, or others with assigned 
responsibility for various monitoring functions rarely interact with the new 
employee.  They may participate in a new-hire orientation, but otherwise deal 
with the newcomer only if the latter’s actions or questions affect their various 
disciplines.  The new employee benefits from a grace period during which minor 
transgressions committed in the course of gathering information are easily 
dismissed as a rookie’s excusable faux pas.  Unless the neophyte does 
something egregious to excite remark, he or she is unlikely to face a random 
audit or active monitoring of computer key strokes, or time and duration of 
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access into a given work space.  On the rare occasion when an infiltrator’s 
actions invite challenge, all that are necessary to deflect focused attention of 
corporate sentinels are a ready apology and a profession of ignorance. 
To further limit opportunities for detecting an infiltrator’s suspicious 
gathering of insider information via random audit, Delphi experts in business and 
operational audit note that so-called random audits are seldom truly random.  As 
Expert 2 pointed out in the preceding chapter, the astute observer sees them 
coming.  Moreover, many audits are perfunctory, particularly if auditors consider 
themselves overextended and loathe taking on the extra work of sustaining a 
negative finding.  As one analyst found in a longitudinal study of organizations 
susceptible to accountability failures, cases are “resource intensive and, as a 
result, enforcement is necessarily selective” (Fishman, p. 274).  This explains 
why a resource-intensive audit will not be “wasted” on a neophyte who has still 
not even passed probation. 
In many, if not most critical infrastructure environments, audits are by 
definition adversarial.  They are, therefore, regarded as a necessary evil 
perpetrated by individuals who are more tolerated than esteemed.  To the extent 
that auditors are aloof, disdainful, or menacing, they struggle to obtain active 
cooperation.  Expert 11 has seen that co-workers are even more likely to defend 
than to report a trust betrayer who has managed to come across as “just one of 
the guys.”  The greater scrutiny is likely to focus on activities affecting financial 
performance or high-value losses.  However, until the moment of attack, the 
infiltrator targeting critical infrastructure is unassociated with any loss-producing 
events that would invite such scrutiny.  In such circumstances, it is the rare audit 
that will identify and focus sufficient attention on an infiltrator to elicit anything 
more than an oral warning or mild rebuke.  Consequently, the traditional audit 




Technology exists to remotely monitor every keystroke an employee 
makes whether operating a desktop computer or a supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) system—the principal means of controlling valves and 
distribution of signals, power, or water when handling a critical infrastructure 
component.  It is possible to configure control room access so that no one 
individual may enter a critical area alone.  It is also possible to monitor such 
areas remotely through video surveillance.  These capabilities can theoretically 
prevent all but the most astute from carrying out undetected acts of mischief.  
However, when applied to the challenge of detecting and thwarting an infiltrator 
bent on attacking critical infrastructure, technology alone falls short, for several 
reasons.  First, for every device capable of tracking activity, there must exist 
somewhere in the institution a means of discriminating untoward activity from 
acceptable routine.  A surveillance camera or automated log cannot by itself tell 
whether an operator laying hands on a SCADA panel is doing his job or 
interfering with another’s.  Such a determination requires human judgment.  True, 
some automated tools can approximate a level of human judgment, if given 
precise details and parameters of what kind or number of transactions become 
suspect once they exceed a certain frequency in a given time period or take up 
significantly more time than necessary.  However, the effort needed to establish 
these boundaries and the resources necessary to automate associated triggers 
exceeds the capacity of the average, financially strapped utility.  Nor is this 
investment in proportion to the expected benefit.  The same caution applies to 
the labor-intensive alternative to this technology-based solution: invasive 
snooping by a designated monitoring force.  Delphi experts with career 
experience as line managers in critical infrastructures opined that such snooping 
negatively affects productivity and morale, while often leading to an unintended 
consequence.  It sparks the creativity of aggrieved operators to find new ways to 
elude or defeat monitoring systems because they dislike being watched like 
wayward children.  Thwarting such corporate sentinels, whether human 
overseers or automated devices, soon becomes part game, part badge of honor.  
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Operators then transfer this knowledge of how to bypass what they regard as 
invasive monitoring to peers and newcomers alike—including the potential 
infiltrator—because they know that if all the workers are defeating Big Brother, 
then management will be unable to single out any one employee for punishment.   
3. Step 3:  Exploit Vulnerabilities 
At this point in the penetration effort, if the infiltrator has managed to 
survive the screening process and stay under the radar of corporate sentinels, 
inertia and initiative are on his side.  The more he blends, the less he stands out, 
and the more likely he is to gain the unwitting support of co-workers and 
management alike, particularly if seen to be a competent team player who gets 
along well with others.    
One contradiction in defensive strategy highlights how traditional 
measures can be self-undermining.  The common thread that unravels the 
foregoing defenses when exploited by an infiltrator or any hostile insider is a lack 
of active involvement on the part of the workforce on the one hand, tied with what 
infrastructure workers perceive as the offensiveness of too much oversight, on 
the other hand.  One career analyst of trust betrayers explained the latter 
phenomenon by stating that vigilance against disloyalty “threatens the ecology of 
trust and raises the likelihood of disloyalty because of a motivation to resist 
excessive oversight “(Carney, 1994, p. 21). 
In this context, the institution comes to rely excessively on its corporate 
sentinels, viz. its designated watchers, such as security staff, leaving the rest of 
the workforce indifferent to a defensive role that the employees and managers 
leave to such specialists.  Meanwhile, the capacity of these sentinels, to focus 
limited resources on discovering a needle-in-the-haystack level of visibility of an 
insider threat is constrained by infrastructure operator resistance to draconian 
security measures that are too costly and impede operations.  Into the space 
between general employee indifference and constraints on corporate sentinels, 
the infiltrator and any insider threat can create a dark corner to carry out hostile 
activity with impunity. 
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C. ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
One way to overcome the vulnerabilities in the foregoing defensive 
measures is to re-examine Figure 10’s penetration sequence in light of how a 
different strategy might apply the same institutional resources to better effect.  
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Figure 11.   Desired End-State for Infrastructure vs. Hostile Insider 
What has changed?  First, the screening process no longer relies 
excessively on a search for indicators that uncover neither infiltrator nor other 
hostile insider.  As one executive who studied trust betrayal for an entire career 
pointed out, many experts find that personnel investigations do not prevent 
espionage or detect those who may commit such a crime (Anderson, 1994, p. 7).  
Instead, the process now pays special attention to verifying identity.  It takes 
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advantage of government resources through a program that U.S. Immigrations 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) makes available to companies and 
infrastructure institutions alike—ICE Mutual Agreement for Government and 
Employers (ICE/IMAGE).  For a fraction of the resources necessary to conduct 
update investigations of utility employees every seven years,9 infrastructure 
employers can instead devote more attention to verifying basic identity and right-
to-work authorizations of new hires in order to defend against potential 
infiltrators.  They improve their internal capacity for such detection by availing 
themselves of a federally funded program that trains human resources recruiters 
to check credentials and gives them access to Social Security and immigration 
databases to facilitate verification of employment eligibility (ICE Mutual 
Agreement for Government and Employers, 2009). 
The new screening program will not necessarily catch all infiltrators any 
more than it will defeat individuals who enter the institution benevolently and only 
later develop hostility and a propensity to betray or destroy.  However, the 
program will reduce the ability of terrorist organizations to infiltrate their agents 
with falsified credentials, which absent increased scrutiny receive only token 
examination from the most junior clerk assigned to employment application 
processing functions.  This is why Figure 11 shows a smaller X next to the arrow 
depicting the infiltrator’s first task.  The new screening program complicates the 
challenge for the infiltrator, but does not eliminate it altogether. 
More importantly, however, the biggest change from the Figure 10 
traditional approach to the Figure 11 alternative is the active engagement of the 
general employee population.  Employees now support the screening process by 
at least verifying credentials through their own professional and trade networks.  
The immediate supervisor monitors the employee closely throughout the 
probationary period.  During this interval, the new default expectation is not that 
                                            
9 The seven-year number is based on the standard state limit for reporting of criminal 
convictions and that the Fair Credit Reporting Act uses for employment-related background 
screening (Pre-employment Background Screening Guideline, pp. 20, 22). 
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all newcomers pass probation absent egregious incidents, but that all are 
released from probation unless they demonstrate talent worth keeping.  This 
demonstration must satisfy not only the supervisor but teammates as well, which 
forces close interaction on a daily basis.  Moreover, during probation, new hires 
are treated like student pilots who are not ready for solo flight—never left alone in 
the cockpit.  Only, in the case of critical infrastructure, the student is a new 
employee and the cockpit is any critical asset or control system.  At the same 
time, this alternative approach requires a culture of constant team interaction and 
self-monitoring that reduces opportunities for probing and undermining the 
institution clandestinely.  It eliminates the dark corners represented by the black 
boxes in Figure 10 because in Figure 11 employee oversight means there are 
fewer places to hide.  This is the No Dark Corners approach that configures the 
job to reduce chances for a sole individual occupying a sensitive area 
undetected.  It breathes life into this security prescription of management expert 
Tom Peters when exhorting security professionals not to see their contribution 
exclusively in the character of corporate sentinels: 
I don’t want you to be security people for the organization, but to 
make everyone else in the organization a security person.  You 
don’t “do” security.  You help all the employees do it … You win the 
game when I and my colleagues are the real security people in the 
place. (Peters, 2007) 
At the heart of the cultural shift, this alternative approach also increases 
the opportunity to defect any insider threat because it spreads defensive 
responsibility pervasively, rather than relying exclusively on corporate sentinels. 
D.  BALANCING TRUST AND TRANSPARENCY: THE CO-PILOT MODEL 
How can a cultural shift in the workplace create a team whose members 
constantly monitor each other without undermining the trust necessary for 
internal cohesion?  On the surface, it would appear that such a team is merely 
relieving assigned corporate sentinels of their snooping duties.  After all, as 
organizational consultant Stephen Covey has observed, suspicion can generate 
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the behaviors that managers and leaders are defending against, thus fostering a 
collusive environment of distrust (2008, p. 292).  Extending the pilot and cockpit 
metaphor from the preceding discussion on probation, however, offers an answer 
to this apparent contradiction. 
In line with the cultural shift to internal team monitoring, every team 
member becomes not an inquisitor but a co-pilot.  The key elements of the co-
pilot definition that apply are of a “qualified pilot who assists or relieves the pilot 
but is not in command” (Merriam-Webster, 2009).  The co-pilot has a vested 
interest in maintaining safe altitude and air speed and in arriving on schedule at 
the right destination.  Applied to the work team, this model makes every team 
member a co-pilot.  Neither a co-pilot nor a team member need become a snoop 
or tattletale.  Yet both should be in a position to fully monitor what is happening in 
cockpit or control room, with aircraft gauges or with SCADA displays.  In this 
context, a co-pilot level of engagement becomes cohesion producing because it 
demonstrates a shared sense of ownership in the team’s work.  (See Appendix 
D, items 1, 2, and 5 for Delphi respondent illustrations of such conditions in 
action.) 
While many parts of a given countermeasure carry forward into the new 
framework, the means of applying the countermeasure changes fundamentally.  
No Dark Corners transforms invasive techniques into performance gauges for 
work teams. A video camera monitoring a critical process involving hazardous 
materials should now be welcome as a way for a fellow team member to be able 
to summon assistance if another team member in the area gets hurt—not as a 
spy camera for helping bosses catch subordinates in the act of violating 
established procedures.  The same cultural shift should make team members 
appreciate having a back-up control room operator or lineman within earshot or 
line of sight rather than bristle at the thought of not being trusted to work alone.  
Embracing the co-pilot model should transform additional physical or electronic 
monitoring into a welcome means of summoning assistance.  It should also limit 
opportunities for a hostile insider to act against the institution.  Ultimately, greater 
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transparency and work redesign should limit opportunities for clandestine and 
damaging activities by eliminating the dark corners that insider threats need to do 
their worst. 
E. CONTRAST WITH TRADITIONAL APPROACH 
Applying the No Dark Corners strategy communicates to the would-be 
insider threat that someone may be watching.  In a traditional approach, the 
watcher is a corporate sentinel, and there are seldom enough of these watchers 
to monitor every process or venue.  By contrast, in a No Dark Corners arena, the 
one who may be watching is a co-worker who has a proprietary interest in the 
institution and will therefore act to defend it. 
Figure 12 highlights key features of this strategy, showing innovations, as 
well as what management authority Peter Drucker emphasized as a primary duty 
of all organizations:  organized abandonment of processes and strategies that 
are no longer working (Drucker, 2002, p. 295).  A method of fostering the 
creation of innovative strategies according to some observers, this grid 
challenges the institution to act on four key features in order to arrive at 
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Figure 12.   Key Features of No Dark Corners Strategy 
As Figure 12 shows, measures that impede an infiltrator’s ability to surveil 
or strike take precedence over measures that are easily bypassed and offer 
negligible value in defeating an insider threat.  Organizing these measures to 
contrast them with the traditional defenses that accepted wisdom favors 
underscores even more the distinctions of the No Dark Corners approach.  
Figure 13 presents this contrast in the form of a strategy canvas where the status 
quo appears in red and a breakaway challenge to this strategy, i.e., No Dark 




Figure 13.   Strategy Canvas:  Traditional vs. No Dark Corners 
The strategy canvas is at once a gauge and a framework for revealing 
where traditional insider defenses have faltered and where the innovations of No 
Dark Corners offer alternatives to reduce chronic vulnerabilities.  The canvas 
visually communicates the current state of affairs in insider threat defense (in 
red) while also showing the potential for breaking new ground (in blue) to reduce 
susceptibility to infiltrators and, by extension, to any hostile insider. 
In addition to adjusting defensive measures already discussed at length 
throughout these pages, Figure 13 draws attention to three particular innovations 
that reflected insights both of Delphi experts and of published analysts of trust  
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betrayers.  These three are close probation, transparency on the job, and team 
self-monitoring.  All three measures offer productivity value, as well as defensive 
benefits.   
CLOSE PROBATION.  As one study shows in extolling the virtues of close 
probation for example, “organizations that systematically integrate new 
employees enjoy lower turnover, and the recruits report greater commitment and 
job satisfaction” (Fernandez-Araoz, Groysberg, & Nohria, 2009, p. 84).  This and 
the other tools intend to defeat hostile insiders through the kind of scrutiny that 
corporate sentinels cannot match, namely, the scrutiny of a co-worker, or what 
one analyst calls a “citizen-sentry” (Fishman, 311).   
In critical infrastructure institutions, probationary periods are the ideal 
means of rejecting a new hire for any reason, without having to meet the rigors of 
bargaining unit constraints that are the equivalent of academic protections for 
tenured professors.  Yet, Delphi respondent experience shows that two parts of 
the probation process are under exploited.  Hiring managers hesitate to release 
probationary employees, particularly if the internal hiring process is lengthy, 
complicated, and demanding of management time.  To make matters worse, in 
many cases, the longer a vacancy goes unfilled, the greater the chance of losing 
that position, as upper management can see that work goes on despite the 
vacancy.  Finally, in areas where supervision is traditionally lax, mentoring and 
monitoring of probationary employees is absent, thereby, predisposing hiring 
managers to keep the probationary employee by default.  In reversal of this 
process, No Dark Corners puts a premium on using the probation period as a line 
of institutional and infrastructure defense.  The default shifts away from keeping 
the new hire absent overwhelming evidence of a problem.  Instead, the default 
becomes termination at the first sign of any problem and automatic release at the 
end of probation absent ostensible proof that the new employee adds value.  The 
only way for this proof to surface is through close supervision, which means 
active engagement of front-line supervisors and fellow members of a work team.   
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The supervisor acts as the pilot, with the rest of the team members as co-pilots—
all having a vested interest in assuring that anyone joining their ranks can be 
trusted in their institution’s equivalent of the cockpit. 
TRANSPARENCY ON THE JOB.  In keeping with the new strategy for 
maximizing the value of probationary periods, transparency on the job means 
that every task, operation, or action performed at a critical infrastructure site 
should be within the actual or virtual line-of-sight of a knowledgeable peer or 
supervisor.  Evoking the two-person-integrity rules of working in some classified 
environments (See Appendix D, item 2 for more details.), every job and work 
space should be designed to maximize visibility to peers and minimize 
opportunities for clandestine, hostile action.  While Level 1 infrastructure utilities 
seldom have the staffing to implement a forced buddy system like this under all 
circumstances, the selective use of surveillance cameras to monitor critical 
operations can at least reduce infiltrator assurance that clandestine attivities will 
remain undetected.  The deterrent value of this kind of system is analogous to 
that of having surveillance cameras and their associated video monitors openly 
placed near the cash register at retail convenience stores.  This practice in retail 
security is thought to deter robbery because of the uncertainty it creates about 
who may be watching in the eyes of the potential robber (Nieto, Johnston-Dodds, 
& Simmons, 2002, p. 34; Murphy, p. 19, 1999).10  Process-monitoring cameras, 
which assist with environmental watching of systems to be sure they are 
operating within design tolerances and of hazardous areas in order to dispatch 
rescue crews, are already commonplace at infrastructure sites, as are security 
surveillance cameras and access control systems in public areas, particularly in 
Britain (Nieto, Johnston-Dodds, & Simmons, 2002, p. 16; Day, 2009, p. 19).11 
                                            
10 Patrick Murphy, Loss Prevention Director for Marriott International, confirmed experiencing 
an 84% decline in losses from armed robberies as a result of such an openly visible installation of 
surveillance cameras, which led him to publish his experience as a best industry practice in 1999 
(personal communication, July 23, 2009). 
11 Richard Day, a manager whose British firm had been experiencing high losses of 
construction equipment to burglars, credited remotely monitored surveillance cameras for 
reducing such losses by 80% as of June 2009. 
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Designing new work sites, as they come online, to increase such visibility 
reduces the perception of concealment opportunities and increases the 
opportunity for fully engaged team members and other employees to spot 
untoward activity while in the course of routinely looking out for each other. 
TEAM SELF-MONITORING.  Finally, No Dark Corners recognizes and 
seeks to exploit the difference between over-the-shoulder audits and self-policing 
out-of-work team cohesion and pride.  As Expert 6 observed, the most effective 
use of audits occurs when internalized at the work team level.  Instead of 
shrinking from oversight as a form of witch hunt, team members focus on “how 
we can make things better” discussions.  By including such discussions in regular 
team meetings and also encouraging informal one-on-one comments between 
employee and supervisor after each formal meeting, members should become 
their own most ardent diagnosticians.  This self-monitoring presents an imposing 
threat of discovery for the infiltrator who may be adroit in hiding from corporate 
sentinels but cannot hide from the team. 
As Expert 11 noted, metrics by themselves may supply only an illusion 
that management can track all work and make necessary course corrections in 
time.  As a senior executive in a large infrastructure organization, he found that 
he did not have time to read let alone check for discrepancies in employee 
performance based on all the timekeeping, output measures, budget variance, 
and failure analysis records available only to senior executives.  So, Expert 11 
pushed out these data to front-line managers who could at least track themselves 
and their own team.  As a result, the managers and soon the team members 
started gauging themselves and monitoring their own performance, improving 
effectiveness in the process.  Some teams competed with each other in friendly 
rivalry.  More teams and their managers, though, began competing with 
themselves, striving to beat last month’s or last year’s best record.  Expert 11 
reasoned that this kind of self-monitoring, properly encouraged and applied to 
defense against insider threats, would present an almost insurmountable 
obstacle to infiltrators intent on an attack against critical infrastructure. 
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F. NO DARK CORNERS’ LINKAGE TO OTHER SECURITY STRATEGIES 
The No Dark Corners strategy of configuring work space for maximizing 
opportunities for teammates to exercise a proprietary interest in their work and 
for promoting transparency relies on employees—legitimate insiders—defending 
an institution and its infrastructure by taking ownership.  No Dark Corners is to 
critical infrastructure what Defensible Space is to community housing and Fixing 
Broken Windows is to community policing:  a defensive strategy relying on 
legitimate users of a given space or activity to exercise a proprietary interest 
sufficient to defeat adversary encroachment.  In his seminal work, architect 
Oscar Newman (1972) examined data from housing projects in New York to 
make a case for reconfiguring residential areas to enhance the natural human 
tendency of territoriality.  In his words, “defensible space is a model for 
residential environments which inhibits crime by creating the physical expression 
of a social fabric that defends itself” (Newman, 1972, p. 3). 
While Newman made efforts to extend his work to nonresidential 
environments with government sponsorship, the latter appeared to make little 
progress in the course of 20 years, despite considerable investment (O. 
Newman, personal communication, November 21, 2002). 
In a variation of Defensible Space applied to order maintenance in public 
spaces, James Q. Wilson and George Kelling offered Broken Windows theory 
ten years later (Wilson & Kelling, 1982).  Then Kelling’s follow-up research 
demonstrated multiple successes in crime reduction in major urban cities (Kelling 
& Coles, 1996)—all based on the premise that neighborhoods decay into crime 
and disorder if the little things, like broken windows, remain untended (Kelling & 
Coles, p. vx).  Soon, vandals break all the remaining windows.  Conversely, 
attention to the little things, like fixing broken windows, sends a communal 
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message of a sense of ownership.  This demonstration of proprietary interest, in 
turn, deters offenders, driving them away from defended areas.12 
No Dark Corners extends the foregoing theme of a sense of ownership to 
critical infrastructure, in a way that recalls the housing application of Defensible 
Space and the community order maintenance of Fixing Broken Windows.  The 
difference is that while the other two models apply exclusively to public spaces, 
No Dark Corners adds private space into the mix, however, as all critical 
infrastructures have control rooms and physical assets that are not open to the 
public, hence, out of the public view.  Invariably, however, critical infrastructures 
also include important assets that are exposed to public view, such as 
transmission lines and aqueducts, which may be visible or accessible by 
members of the public. 
Why has this not happened before?13  First, infrastructure defense is 
assumed to fall primarily into the hands of the private sector, which operates 85% 
of critical infrastructure (Lewis, p. 56–57).  By extension, the critical assets must, 
therefore, be under private control, hence, not in the kinds of public spaces 
where there apply existing models of defense through a sense of ownership, like 
Defensible Space and Broken Windows theories.  The reality, however, is that  
 
                                            
12 Kelling’s theory is not without its critics.  However, much of the criticism is directed not at 
whether Fixing Broken Windows works to take back public spaces from offenders who otherwise 
scare legitimate users of the public away, but at larger societal issues, such as the inevitable 
displacement of offender activity that occurs in neighboring communities that are not using the 
same strategy.  The criticism is along the lines that applying Broken Windows just pushes a 
problem from one neighborhood to another.  Similarly, other critics object that changing 
demographics may also account for crime, thus bringing into question Broken Windows as a 
panacea.  One criticism even went so far as to opine that greater access of unwed mothers to 
abortion should account for crime reduction because children who would have grown to be 
criminals were aborted, and Kelling did not credit this phenomenon in his theory (Levitt & Dubner, 
2005).  Since Kelling did not offer his theory as a panacea or as the sole explanation for 
decreases in crime, himself taking account of other factors, including Newman’s work, it is more 
accurate to say his theory may have been challenged but not discredited in terms of actual aims 
and results. More recent criticisms focus on community policing aspects of the theory, which vary 
greatly depending on the police force.  However, researchers, Braga and Bond, highlighted this 
point but vindicated the theory in a recent study, which found that cleaning up the physical 
environment in Lowell, MA, was very effective, while a corresponding increase in misdemeanor 
arrests was not (Johnson, 2009). 
13 Item 5, Appendix D, offers one Delphi expert’s perspective on this topic. 
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critical infrastructure may be impossible to secure in some cases, as in 
transmission lines, aqueducts, and fiber-optic cables stretching across broad 
expanses of undefended territory. 
No Dark Corners reduces relatively unproductive but resource-intensive 
investment in countermeasures that an infiltrator can readily bypass.  The 
strategy shifts exclusive reliance of institutions on overly specialized monitors, 
the corporate sentinels, to the larger employee population, especially the work 
team closest to the infiltrator or other hostile insider.  It also redirects some 
investment away from moderately useful pre-employment background 
investigations and unproductive update investigations, which may deter obvious 
criminals but will not defeat a hostile infiltrator.14  Instead, the strategy shifts this 
investigative scrutiny to verifying identity and right-to-work documentation, which 
takes the form of supplemental identification, and which the Immigrations and 
Customs Enforcement arm of DHS is advancing through its ICE/IMAGE program 
of enhancing the capacity of all employers, including infrastructure stewards, to 
close the door to a major penetration vulnerability in the hiring process (op cit). 
At the same time, this new strategy brings to bear the tools of close 
probation, work redesign for transparency, and self-monitoring for greater 
engagement of the employee population and, in particular, the work team.   
G. ENVISIONING A NO DARK CORNERS WORKPLACE 
In a No Dark Corners workplace, standard screening will have new 
emphasis on identity and right-to-work verification and false credentials will be 
subject to discovery, making it particularly difficult for a foreign adversary to 
penetrate an American institution.  Close probation means an infiltrator will face 
unabated scrutiny, supervision, and evaluation.  Similarly, a fully engaged 
                                            
14 Basic pre-employment background investigations continue to offer value as a tool of due 
diligence that may detect or deter criminals and individuals with a history of misconduct.  They do 
not pose a seriously to a moderately prepared infiltrator whose selection will in some measure 
depend on having a history free of criminal convictions and otherwise free of easily identifiable 
discrepancies that background checks are designed to spot. 
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employee population and work flow design that eliminates hiding places while 
promoting transparency will reduce opportunities for the infiltrator gathering 
sensitive information unrelated to the individual job and breaching protocols 
under the banners of ignorance or deficient supervision.  Corporate sentinels 
previously mistrusted will be accessible to team members to follow up on their 
concerns and suspicions.  In the process, the sentinels themselves will become 
part of the extended family seen as supporting the work team.  Opportunities for 
unfettered, clandestine access will be severely constrained, subject to monitoring 
by people or devices, and too limited to exploit reliably. 
H.  LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Just as Kelling’s 1996 work on Broken Windows took experimental efforts 
in several municipalities to support the theory he and James Q. Wilson first 
espoused in 1982, No Dark Corners awaits the refinement and validation that 
would follow introduction of this model into an institution that acts as a critical 
infrastructure steward.  Ideally, such an institution could be compared to a sister 
utility or agency of comparable size and function.  Results of this comparison 
would draw on a broad array of metrics, including measures of general 
productivity, positive or negative impacts attributed to insiders, and relative 
expenditure of resources for defense against adversaries.  Alternatively, a single 
institution adopting the No Dark Corners strategy could compare itself across a 
similar scale to determine the impact of the new strategy in relation to previous 
experiences with insider problems under alternative defensive strategies. 
I. CONCLUSION 
As this study suggests, a hostile insider needs three essentials to carry 
out an attack against critical infrastructure:  a worthy target, an open door, and a 
dark corner.  Any adversary seeking to strike a devastating blow against any 
institution needs the same. 
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Level 1 critical infrastructures, such as power, water, and 
telecommunications make worthy targets.  Not only are some of them 
irreplaceable, their damage or destruction leads to cascading failure of other, 
interdependent infrastructure components, from banking and finance to 
emergency responders, from transportation and logistics to food and agriculture.  
All depend on the Level 1 infrastructures. 
The open door comes from a traditional culture of unrestricted public 
access.  This openness traditionally flourishes because public and investor-
owned utilities must answer to a demanding public, ratepayers, and various 
regulatory agencies.  Even when these infrastructure stewards have critical 
assets to protect, when it comes to their public customers, they cannot be 
perceived as having something to hide.  In this environment, defenses against 
infiltrators or any type of insider threat require a cultural shift.  The challenge is to 
close the door to infiltrators while leaving it open to legitimate workers. 
Even if an infiltrator sets sights on a worthy infrastructure target and 
exploits weak defenses, he or she still needs a dark corner free of oversight or 
restraint in order to gather pre-strike intelligence and then initiate an attack 
without risk of timely intervention and defeat.  The best way to defeat such an 
attack is to remove the dark corners. 
Second, as previously mentioned, Americans have a penchant for relying 
on technology to solve problems.  This tendency places a premium on depth, at 
the occasional expense of breadth.  As a result, in addressing the insider threat 
to critical infrastructure, the tendency leaves us attempting to penetrate with the 
intensity and focus of a laser what we should be illuminating with a flashlight.  No 
matter how deep the laser drills, it points to only a fragment of the entire picture.  
Caught in the laser’s beam, a clever insider can mask or explain away hostile 
activities with relative impunity. 
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The No Dark Corners approach substitutes the flashlight of open team and 
employee engagement for the laser of limited and specialized monitoring of 
corporate sentinels working in secret.  It represents a method of implementing 
layered defenses, particularly on the front lines of detection and intervention:  
where critical operations take place. 
Despite generations of study, the insider threat remains alive.  Infiltrators 
continue to pose a risk to critical infrastructure.  There are no easy answers.  No 
Dark Corners shows promise, however, as an approach that fills the gaps in 
traditional defenses.  In so doing, this approach stands poised to deliver an 




APPENDIX A:  THREE ROUNDS OF DELPHI QUESTIONS 
The following materials were sent to Delphi respondents over the course 
of two months to solicit their thoughts as part of the insider threat study.  An 
interval of at least two weeks separated each of the three rounds of Delphi 
questions. 
A. DELPHI ROUND 1 QUESTIONS 
 
1.  What is an insider threat in your view?  Are there different kinds of insider 
threat?  Please elaborate. 
 
2.  What do you see or have you seen that is observable in insider tactics? 
 
If it helps to think of specific cases, without revealing any confidential or sensitive 
details, please comment on these questions in relation to a significant case you 
have experienced: 
 
3.  What did the trust betrayer do and for what motives? 
 
4.  What caused the trust betrayer to be exposed? 
 
5.  What signs pointed the way to the exposure? 
 
Any other comments or insights you would like to add. 
 
B. DELPHI ROUND 2 QUESTIONS 
Thank you for participating in this study, once again.  This time, let me 
incorporate input that came out of the first round into the current round of 
questions.  We begin with some common denominator observations for all of you 
to rate on a scale of 1–5, follow with six questions that encourage you to 
comment, and end with some scenario questions for your reaction. 
 
PART I:  Ratings 
 
Please rate these questions according to whether you agree or disagree, so that 




Rating Scale:  1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral or no strong position, 4 = agree, 5 
= strongly.  Feel free to add comments, particularly if I have missed something. 




A. Insider threats are people who possess 
legitimate access and occupy a position of trust 
in or with the organization that they are 
targeting. 
  
B. The hostile insider most dangerous to an 
organization is likely to display "beat the 
system" talk or behaviors. 
  
C. He or she is likely to be secretive.   
D. He or she is likely to demonstrate an 
excessively proprietary interest in the job, 
including working unpaid for long hours. 
  
E. He or she is likely to hoard or withhold 
information from others. 
  
F. He or she is likely to show signs of elitism, 
arrogance, or acting superior to others. 
  
G. He or she may display unexplained changes in 
personality, mood, or conduct. 
  
H. He or she may appear resentful, disgruntled, or 
anti-social. 
  
I. He or she is often the picture of the perfect 
employee. 
  
J. He or she gives the impression of wanting to get 
even. 
  
K. He or she is constantly seeking power.   
L. He or she uses words like "unfair" and "hostile 
workplace," particularly if a malicious whistle-
blower. 
  
M. He or she exhibits a decline in job performance.   
 
 
PART II:  Questions for Your Reaction and Comment 
 
1.  Some pattern analysis software (www.tagcrowd.com) identified unexplained 
anger as a common indicator that often surfaced in your collective descriptions 
of insider threats.  Did I capture this correctly?  In other words, does this make 
sense to you?  Please comment. 
 
2.  Similarly, random audits or investigations based on reported suspicions, or 
even just as a matter of due diligence, appeared to emerge as a consistently 
mentioned countermeasure for stopping an insider threat before it is too late.  Do 




3.  One of you pointed out that the more dangerous threats are either people who 
are suffering personal distress and seeking relief (like those responsible for 
workplace violence), or those who are more goal-oriented and seeking victory 
(like saboteurs).  Do you agree?  Please comment. 
 
4.  Another of you suggested that the most dangerous insiders generally fall into 
one of three categories:  embezzler-thief, saboteur, and shooter.  In this model, 
the embezzler-thief and saboteur are planners, while the shooter is more likely to 
erupt with "no coherent plan beyond buying large quantities of ammunition before 
the violent deed."  Is it useful to think of insider threats by rating them High, 
Medium, or Low across these three dimensions?   Do you agree?  Please 
comment. 
 
5.  Who would you worry more about as a threat to other people:  the insider 
who erupts or the insider who plans?  Why? 
 
6.  Who would you worry more about as a threat to the institution, as someone 
who can take down the entire enterprise or organization:  the insider who erupts 
or the insider who plans?  Why? 
 
PART III:  Scenarios and Related Questions 
 
Finally, look at two hypothetical insiders, Herman and Edna.  They represent 
composites of your previous inputs and are chosen to represent potentially 
serious insider threats.  You'll see a little information about them, followed by 
some questions. 
 
Both Herman and Edna work for the same government agency, the state lottery 
commission of a northeastern state in the U.S.  This institution is co-located in a 
complex housing the offices of the governor and leaders of the state legislature, 
who participate actively in VIP events involving the lottery commission, 
particularly since it has become a reliable source of revenue to offset state fiscal 
pressures.  You will find the descriptions of these employees incomplete, to leave 
room for your imagination and to reflect realistic information gaps that 

















--18-year employee of State Lottery 
Commission 
--Competent in his area but passed over for 
promotions for last 7 years 
--Works uncompensated long hours and 
weekends 
--Very jealous of his turf and prerogatives 
--Hoards information, likes to be sole expert in 
his area 
--Bristles when questioned about his area, 
generally browbeats auditors with jargon and 
younger, timid supervisors into leaving him 
alone 
--Gives surface impression of ideal employee, 
but heard berating upper management in 
cafeteria and other informal settings 
--Rumored to have been involved somehow in 
involuntary transfer of one supervisor and in 
unexpected resignation of another because of 
allegations of discrimination that were not 
conclusively proven 
--18-year employee of State Lottery Commission 
--Average worker but attendance and 
performance in decline during past 6 months 
--Overheard complaining about being sued by 
former partner for unpaid child support 
--Changed work location after ridicule by two co-
workers, one a former sexual partner who has 
since filed 3 grievances and 1 ADA complaint 
against her 
--Repeatedly asked supervisor for overtime 
opportunities in order to pay for her mother’s 
dialysis treatments 
--In last month, reported petty theft and 
vandalizing of her desk 
--Found her car “keyed” in employee parking lot 
before it was repossessed 2 weeks ago 
--Avoids her supervisor and no longer eats lunch 
in cafeteria 
--Is currently in process of having her wages 
garnished for unpaid child support as result of 
former domestic partner winning judgment 
against her in court 
 
1.  Which of these employees do you rate as potentially more dangerous to co-
workers?   
 
2.  Which do you rate as a greater potential danger to the institution? 
 
3.  You just received a tip that one or both of these employees may be involved 
in some unauthorized activity that constitutes a threat to the State Lottery 
Commission or its staff.  Who would you judge to be more likely to be involved in 
the following, Herman or Edna? 
 
A.  An attack of workplace violence that targets the payroll manager, a 
supervisor, and two co-workers.   
 
B.  A complex fraud scheme, undetected for years, that redirects a fraction of a 
penny spent on purchases of multiple lottery tickets.  The funds go to an offshore 
bank account and, depending on the extent of the losses and negative press, the 
revelation could threaten the survival of the state’s lottery system. 
 
C.  Compromise of insider details of a VIP event to a group of extremists 
operating as a nonprofit corporation that has been suspected of planning to 
assassinate the governor as a political statement. 
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D.  Join an activist group through the Internet and, after being befriended by 
them at after-hours meetings and social events over a period of 18 months, offer 
to provide information that will allow insider access during an upcoming ribbon-
cutting ceremony where the governor and several state government and 
business executives will be in attendance. 
 
Comments on any or all of the above: 
C. DELPHI ROUND 3 QUESTIONS 
Thank you for your continued participation.  Through your responses and 
comments, you have provided useful insights on indicators of insider threats, as 
well as ideas on how to stop them.  You will find a one-page summary of 
highlights from the last round in Attachment 1.  Some of you wanted to know how 
your answers corresponded with others, hence more detailed diagrams 
summarizing the findings in Attachment 2.  Both attachments are purely optional, 
for perusal at your convenience.   
You have all been very gracious and generous with your replies, so I hope this 
final round will be less demanding and a little fun.  Please respond in two weeks. 
We now focus on countermeasures.  There is only one rating question, and an 
opportunity to unleash your imagination in tackling one problem.  Now, you are 
the opposition.  Think like a terrorist for the rating question and your attending 
comments.  
Your Task:  Attack one of these critical infrastructure targets (your choice):  
water, electricity, or telecommunications utility.  (Dr. Ted Lewis, author of Critical 
Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security and one of my instructors, rates 
these as Tier 1 critical infrastructures because of their capacity for influencing 
cascading failures among the rest.)   
Your Method:  Infiltrate one of these infrastructure stewards (i.e. a public sector 
or private sector utility) or recruit an agent from within the utility to inflict 
maximum damage directly or by supplying invaluable information and access to 
your attack cell, which will do the dirty work. 
Your Timing:  6 months – 8 years (This is based on two things.  One is the 
interval between attacks on the World Trade Center.  Another is an al Qaeda 
operative quote by Richard Miniter in Losing Bin Laden (Washington D.C.:  
Regnery Publishing, 2003, p. 95) which highlighted the willingness to lie in wait.  
Early in his training, an al Qaeda operative … recalls repeatedly chanting this 




Please rate these countermeasures according to which you would consider the 
most challenging if planning to attack a critical infrastructure target from within.  
You will see the countermeasures described briefly below, with room for your 
ratings next to them.   
Rating Scale:  1 = no obstacle, 2 = easily overcome, 3 = problem but 
surmountable with average planning and resources, 4 = significant hurdle but 
surmountable with considerable effort and resources, 5 = significant hurdle and 
possibly insurmountable.   
COUNTERMEASURES 
A.  Brother’s Keeper option that encourages co-workers to identify and act on 
suspicions of hostile or inexplicable insider activities.  This could even be similar 
to acting on reasonable suspicion to report a substance abuse problem at work.  
RATING (1–5):  _____ 
B.  No Dark Corners option, or no alone zone, that configures work in a way that 
aims to reduce chances for a sole individual working in a sensitive area 
undetected, with either another trusted employee within line of sight or some 
form of remote surveillance or detection creating the possibility that someone 
may be watching.  Some of you have seen this in the defense or nuclear security 
industry.  RATING (1–5):  _____ 
C.  Random Audits option, which could be operational, process, financial audits 
or any combination that would potentially uncover evidence of hostile activity.  
RATING (1–5):  _____ 
D.  Technology-Based Monitoring option, which would involve automated 
controls and alarms that annunciate or terminate access and generate exception 
reports whenever an employee attempts to gain unauthorized access or exceeds 
a defined number of authorized queries and transactions in a sensitive area.  
RATING (1–5):  _____ 
E.  Background Investigations or Updates option, which involves screening of 
new hires and possible periodic update investigations of existing employees.  





F.  Sting or Dangle Operations option, which involves flushing out hostile 
insiders by pretext and could include luring a hostile insider to join what purports 
to be a terrorist organization that does not really exist or having a trusted insider 
exhibit behaviors that give the appearance of being an excellent recruitment 
target for you to cultivate, not realizing that this is a double agent.  RATING (1–
5):  _____ 
G.  Other:  your own idea or ideas that do not fit into the options above and 
would rate at least a  
4.  RATING (1–5):  _____ 
TASK:  Which infrastructure did you select as your target (water, electricity, or 
telecommunications utility)?  Why? 
METHOD:  Which method did you select (infiltrating with your own operative, or 
recruiting an agent already there)?  Why?  If you recruited someone already in 
place, what is the most you expect this person to do for you? COMMENTS on 
ratings, countermeasures, or your own thoughts about how you would conduct 
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APPENDIX B.  SUMMARY OF DELPHI ROUND 1 FINDINGS 
ACCOMPANYING ROUND 2 QUESTIONS 
Thoughts from Delphi Round 1 
 
For those of you able to review this information, here is some preliminary 
analysis of responses to the first round of questions in the Delphi survey on the 
insider threat.  The next round will focus on telltale signs or indicators (aka 
traplines).  The final round will focus on countermeasures (aka tripwires).   
 
These were some of the more interesting insights that surfaced: 
 
 Conversational spillage/inexplicably hostile behavior, own disclosure 
 "Beat the system" talk, behaviors; rumors and suspicions reported to 
management and then investigated; greatest loss from insider at highest level 
 Sick fun; frequent rotations, good auditing 
 Getting even a central theme 
 Reduce discoverability; decline in performance; visible anti-social behaviors.   
"Sudden” anomalies usually have precursors that supervisors don’t act on. 
 Persons who hate are usually outspoken about it. 
 Unexplained changes of personality, mood, or conduct; unexplained money, 
family life, outside associates.  Every advance in technology creates new 
vulnerabilities. 
 Always exploits the organization's weakness.  Deterred only by strong chance 
of discovery and swift punishment.  Insider is never observed as a threat, 
employs secrecy, often the picture of the perfect employee.  Whistle-blower.   
 Self-aggrandizement.  Ideology may play a lesser role in corporate cases but 
is primary in a terrorist scenario. 
 Elitism or anger and aggression; considers others inferior.  Expressed hate 
and anger.  Secrecy, self-aggrandizement; growing hostility, unexplained 
anger. 
 Constantly seeking power, dismissive of victim(s) 
 For cases of violence, not sneaky but stewing in own myopic juices.  
Malicious whistle-blower slowly builds up a body of questionable 
documentation.   A shooter acts alone and is looking for relief and can often 




In addition to looking for common themes and unique observations, I used a tool 
called Tag Crowd to make some patterns more visually obvious.  This visual 
analysis of survey data is available at http://www.tagcrowd.com at no cost for 
individual and educational uses, thanks to Daniel Steinbock, a doctoral student at 
Stanford University.  The output itself is called a text cloud, which is also referred 
to as a tag cloud.  You will see two of these on the next page. 
 
 













The first text cloud compilation and sorting of overall responses, highlights 
observations and themes common to the insider threat writ large, i.e., the insider 
as an employee, often motivated by financial gain, operating in an organization, 
and subject to being given away by actions, audits, and behaviors. 
 
The second text cloud, concentrating exclusively on the more telling remarks of 
respondents, begins to lend greater granularity to the first image.  More 
indicators begin to surface, with the most telling summarized as unexplained 
anger, the two most prominent words in the text cloud.  Other themes emerge as 
potentially revealing indicators, such as tendencies of self-aggrandizement and 
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secrecy among hostile insiders, which offer possibilities for detection when tied to 
corresponding traits and behaviors.  Interestingly, “whistle-blower” appears in 
both the more general text cloud and the more sharply focused one.  
Respondents with backgrounds in the worlds of corporate fraud investigations, 
intelligence, and clinical assessment of workplace violence threats independently 
converged on the notion that malicious whistle-blowers are beginning to emerge 
as nascent saboteurs.  It is equally interesting to note that money and financial 
gain, which were prominent in Figure 1, are absent from Figure 2.  One 
respondent indirectly offered the reason for this omission by noting that the most 
destructive damage is rarely driven purely by a desire for financial gain.   
 
The foregoing use of text clouds fell short of supporting the investigator’s 
preliminary sense of emerging distinctions in attempting to divide insider threats 
into overly restrictive and artificial categories.  Consequently, the preliminary 
categorization effort postulating the existence of a spectrum of trust betrayers 
found insufficient traction to survive closer scrutiny.  However, thanks to the text 
cloud analysis and the further, iterative study of responses that this analysis 
inspired, a dichotomy began to emerge and formulate the basis for Delphi Round 
2 inquiries. 
 
Specifically, is there value in broadly categorizing insider threats in terms of 
whether they plan their attacks?  Evidence of planning corresponds to the insight 
of a behaviorist who noted that the saboteur’s objective is seeking victory.  By 
contrast, a dearth of planning that could instead present itself as an eruption 
corresponds to what the same respondent called the shooter’s objective of 
seeking relief.  Pursuing such a dichotomy further also offers value in that it 
creates nesting areas for the different types of cases already cited by the 
respondents while offering a simpler, more intuitive way of drawing distinctions 
and seeking corresponding behavioral signatures that could give away malicious 
insiders before they carry out their attacks.  Thus, this new tentative 
categorization forms the basis not only for further questions but for formulation of 
two different kinds of insider threat scenario to now structure respondent thinking 
along common denominators without pre-ordaining responses. 
 
As Delphi Round 2 begins to sharpen the focus on traplines, that is, on the 
behavioral signatures and other indicators that will assist defenders in identifying 
hostile insiders, Table 3 offers a framework for distinguishing the insider threats 
who can be fatal to an institution from those whose potential lethality is largely 








Table 3:  Proposed Insider Threat Dichotomy 
 
THOSE WHO PLAN THOSE WHO ERUPT 
More dangerous to institution More dangerous to individual(s) 
Seek victory Seek relief 
More meticulous, analytical, 
secretive, subtle, deceptive 
Guileless, self-revealing 
Target the institution Target individual or individuals perceived 
to be causing them distress 
Ideologically oriented or entirely 
mercenary 
Victimized or self-described as 
victimized or wronged 
Dismissive of victims, angry at them, 
acts superior to them 
Dismissive of victims, angry at them, 
acts as if unfairly treated by them 
Exploits organization’s weaknesses Exploits organizational weaknesses 
Picture of the perfect employee Declining performance 
Self-aggrandizing, self-enriching, in 
control 
Territorial, turf conscious, losing control 
Getting even, disgruntled Getting justice, disgruntled 





APPENDIX C.  SUMMARY OF DELPHI ROUND 2 FINDINGS 
ACCOMPANYING ROUND 3 QUESTIONS 
Highlights of Delphi Round 2 
 
Part I 
 DISAGREE NEUTRAL AGREE 
STRONGLY 
AGREE  
A   58% 42% Definition 
B 17% 42% 33% 8% Beat the system 
C 8% 42% 17% 33% Secretive 
D 8% 17% 58% 17% Owns the job 
E  33% 33% 33% Withholds info 
F 8% 25% 25% 42% Arrogant, elitist 
G  25% 33% 42% Unexplained changes 
H  8% 67% 25% Resentful 
I 17% 42% 42%  "Perfect" employee 
J 8% 50% 42%  Getting even 
K 33% 42%  25% Seeking power 
L  42% 50% 8% Says "unfair" 




Most Useful Distinctions:  unexplained anger as common indicator, random 





Planner is more dangerous, more prone to complex fraud.  But planner could 
also do more physical harm than insider who erupts.  Also, planner may not be a 




Some themes where there was strong convergence: 
 
 Indicators of unexplained changes in behavior and in resentful or disgruntled 
presentation of the hostile insider. 
 
 Secondary indicators of the hostile insider exercising overly proprietary 
interest in the job, expressing a perception of unfair treatment, and appearing 
arrogant or elitist. 
  
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 Random audit as a good, if not the best, countermeasure 
 
 The planner as the bigger threat to the institution, with some distinctions 
offered in remarks to the effect that a workplace violence attack, or rage 
killing, might constitute a personal tragedy for those victimized but was not an 
existential threat to the institution. 
Other themes which showed early promise in surfacing useful distinctions for 
further probing ended up being dry holes.  Some of these: 
 
 The insider as one who withholds information.  Respondents suggested that 
this might be true enough but was often difficult if not impossible to gauge 
until after the fact, hence of limited predictive value. 
 
 Seeking power, being secretive, and exhibiting decline in performance also 
proved to be nonstarters.  Clarifying comments explained that some of these 
traits were equally visible elsewhere, hence of limited value in trying to 
uncover hostile insiders.  One respondent reasoned that ambitious 
competitors could easily seek power without becoming insider threats.  
Similarly, another respondent noted that, in his experience with traitors, once 
they had embarked upon a plan for stealing secrets to pass to a foreign 
power, they tended to level off in their outward ambitions and general 
performance.  Evidently, this is to avoid inviting scrutiny while, at the same 
time, concentrate their energies on their clandestine endeavors. 
 Efforts at categorization, whether as an insider seeking victory vs. relief, or as 
belonging to one of three classes (embezzler-thief, saboteur, or shooter (rage 
killer/workplace violence perpetrator) also went nowhere.  Parts of these were 
negated by the very respondents who first suggested them.  Evidently, there 
is just too much variation in views and in real cases to permit ready 
categorization along these lines. 
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APPENDIX D.  EXPERT COMMENTS AND STORIES 
Delphi respondents included a number of remarks and stories that went 
beyond their responses to specific questions.  Select examples that illustrate or 
supplement other research findings appear below. 
A. TRANSPARENCY:  PUSHING OUT MANAGEMENT DATA  
When they first started becoming available, and some time afterwards, 
management reports were pretty restricted.  The idea was that it took a lot of 
work to produce them.  They contained inside information that could be 
embarrassing to some people or could even increase liability if in the wrong 
hands.  The trouble was, that the reports only went to top managers, and any 
good top manager lacked the extra time necessary to break down the reports 
and study them at length to compare against employee and work unit 
performance.  Sure, spot checks were possible.  I tried those.  But, they 
remained pretty much hit and miss.  No one could spot check every operation, 
and it seemed unfair to single out only the ones within reach.   
One day, I looked at a stack of attendance reports, budget variances, 
analysis of problems we had experienced with some expensive equipment, 
overtime statistics, and other such things that were piling up on my credenza.  
Realizing I would never have time to go through them all before my secretary 
ultimately filed or tossed them, I decided I either had to find a way for getting 
value out of them or taking my name off distribution.  So, I broke them down and 
pushed them out to the front-line managers responsible for their various work 
units and teams.  Guess what?  They were the best people to get the reports.  
Why?  Because they recognized every person and line item mentioned, knew 
instinctively what was working and what was out of line, and welcomed the 
chance to use them to keep score.  It saved me a lot of work and put the right 
yardstick in the hands of the people who needed to measure in inches and feet 
every month the kinds of things I could only afford to look at in miles and on a 
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quarterly basis.  Besides, their own teams started looking forward to the details to 
know how well they did compared to another team at a different plant or 
compared to their own performance a year ago.   
A great example was overtime.  By parceling out OT reports to each 
manager and team, we saved $1.5 million the first yea—just by looking through 
the eyes of the people closest to the affected areas.  The same kind of cost 
savings occurred when we figured out how to do this with cellular telephone bills.   
There is no substitute for displaying results for everyone to see.  This is 
what makes metrics meaningful.  Otherwise, employees treat what you are telling 
them like just an opinion. 
B TWO-PERSON RULE  
It used to be called the two-man rule, or the two-person-integrity rule.  
According to one classified program’s description of how this works, the rule is 
designed to bar access to a sensitive area or asset by any lone individual.  Two 
authorized employees are considered present when they are physically in a 
position where they can positively identify use of unauthorized procedures in 
relation to the operation at hand.  The two-person team must be knowledgeable 
of safety and security requirements and both individuals must be present during 
any activity requiring access to sensitive areas or equipment.  Each of the two is 
responsible for enforcing the two-person rule at all times while in the sensitive 
area where the rule applies. 
C. A BUSINESS DECISION TO FAVOR INFILTRATORS 
I would not target an insider already in place because the task of 
identifying an appropriate and vulnerable employee who could be recruited is too 
difficult, and failure would compromise my program. 
One way to insulate the attack from compromise is to keep the infiltrator 
unaware of the ultimate objective.  This could also help the infiltrator pass a 
background check, particularly if the details of the operation were spectacular 
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enough to make him nervous, if he were aware of them.  His time on the job 
would be spent figuring how to bypass technical countermeasures.  He would act 
“normal,” fit in, and be part of the team. 
D. SMALL WORLD INSIDER CHALLENGES 
Recruiting an agent is impossible in small town environments or small 
utilities where the locals all know each other intimately.  In many ways, these 
environments create a degree of transparency that becomes lifelong and remains 
very insular.  Outsiders spend years trying to achieve the same level of trust that 
is automatically conferred to Bobby Joe’s grandson who is also the nephew of 
Rita Sue, the mayor’s sister.  In these places, infiltration is most effective via 
contractors. 
Contract employees in place for extended periods of construction tend to 
be unescorted and gain unlimited access to critical areas because there is 
nobody to watch them.  Companies often employ non-English speaking workers 
who are faceless and interchangeable in their eyes, as long as they can meet the 
requirements of hard labor associated with construction work.   
E. WHY NO “BROKEN WINDOWS” IN INFRASTRUCTURE DEFENSE 
The reasons we have not extended these concepts from protecting 
communities to institutions and infrastructure are that we assume infrastructure is 
under private control.  So, it becomes someone else’s problem.  Also, the 
traditional labor-management and public right-to-know pressures have dominated 
in the boardroom and in regulatory decision-making environments, thereby 
reducing the market for or receptivity to such concepts.  Moreover, when there is 
success in altering the culture of these institutions, the victories tend to be 
attributed to and monopolized by the founder or chief executive.  In reality, 
whether it is a teacher presiding in a classroom or a cop maintaining order on the 




brink of bankruptcy—no one does it alone.  This achievement requires a sense of 
ownership on the part of all the people on the team.  With it, amazing things 
happen.  Without it, even mediocrity may remain out of reach. 
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